


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
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4

THE EDUCATIONAL THEORIES
OF
HERBART AND FROEBEL

TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

CONTRIBUTIONS TO EDUCATION

NO. 4

THE

EDUCATIONAL THEORIES

OF

HERBART AND FROEBEL

BY

JOHN ANGUS MACVANNEL, PH.D.



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THE EDUCATIONAL THEORIES OF HERBART AND FROEBEL

INTRODUCTION

The rough notes and suggestions furnished in this Syllabus are an attempt (*a*) to outline the evolution of educational ideas from Rousseau to Froebel as an outcome of the more general movement in social theory, (*b*) to relate the educational theories of Herbart and Froebel to the wider intellectual movements of Romanticism, Realism, and Idealism. It is assumed that no theory, ethical, philosophical, educational, can be completely understood when isolated from the human conditions which produced it. The evolution of educational opinion is part of the entire intellectual and social movement of a period. The outline aims to trace in a genetic way the emergence of certain ideas within a particular period and the transformation of educational problems by these ideas. It does not, however, underrate the value of the study of the personalities of the men through whom these ideas found their first adequate expression. A syllabus is at best a provisional sketch,—part seen, imagined part. Brevity without injury to clearness is in a very real sense possible only after the most detailed exposition. The syllabus of a period so complex as the one here outlined can be nothing more than a plan of action, serving its purpose if it in some small way assist students in the organization of such means of communication as may render easier the transition from one branch of knowledge to another. In the course the attempt is made gradually to formulate a methodology of the educational problem, and thus have it serve as an approach to a study of the Philosophy of Education.

The syllabus as a whole aims to indicate the nature of philosophic method in the study of the evolution of educational ideas rather than to increase the store of information concerning them. In the present outline the notes and references may prove suggestive in some directions: they are not intended to be exhaustive in any direction whatever.

I

THE PERIOD AND THE POINT OF VIEW

1. It is a matter of common knowledge that there cannot be any adequate appreciation of the educational theories of the present without some understanding of the foundations of such theories in the needs and aspirations, the intellectual and social tendencies of the past. To reach any definite conclusions in regard to fundamental tendencies in the present, a study is necessary of the previous conditions through which they passed in order to reach the present. For in any study involving personal and social progress there may be recognized certain well-defined conceptions formerly maintained, which, compared with the present, will indicate with a fair degree of security the line of future advance. Education is a dynamic, growing process, a part of a changing social situation: its theory is in turn a function of the wider intellectual and spiritual life of the particular period.

2. Educational theory, even while having its especial and clearly limited object, is closely involved in the life of each civilization, and, indeed, in the life of every people. In each age it acts upon the spirit of the people, and is in turn reacted upon by that spirit. In its development it is continuous with the development of other intellectual and social movements, of literature, art and science, of economics, politics and religion. In looking back over the history of the intellectual and social life of mankind it would appear to be true that transitional eras in scientific, ethical, political or religious thought were also eras of corresponding changes in educational theory and practice, *e. g.*, as the present outline will attempt to show, the development of educational ideas from Rousseau to Froebel is continuous with the simultaneous transformation and development of philosophical and social theories, the intellectual, moral and æsthetic products, of the period from Rousseau to Hegel.

3. It is still in many quarters an open question whether great educators should be thought of as heroes to be worshipped, as Carlyle would demand, or as representative men who are to be followed because they express what all are thinking, as Emerson would have us believe. Though, in many cases, not philosophers in any technical sense, the great educators inevitably became vehicles of philosophical ideas and of social tendencies. Indeed, their essential originality in most instances consists in the degree to which they were able to synthesize their educational beliefs with the dominant intellectual movements of their time. While, therefore, in the present outline, the emphasis is concerned with the evolution of ideas rather than the biography of writers, it would not underrate the necessity of maintaining a balance or proportion between persons and ideas. It is easy to over-emphasize either, and thus tend to give a very misleading view of a period such as the one under consideration. For in the thought and teachings of the great educational leaders, embodying, as we have seen, the philosophical and social tendencies of their period, is found a unique confirmation of the personal as well as the organic nature of human life: from the interdependence, moreover, of many and varied tendencies in literature, philosophy, political theory, ethics, and theology, one is inevitably led to a deeper view of human thought and activity, and of the spiritual foundations of both.

4. The period 'From Rousseau to Froebel' lies between what may rightly be regarded as two great events in the evolution of educational ideas, (a) the indictment of civilization and culture by Rousseau, and (b) the unique reconstruction of educational theory attempted by Froebel. The development of educational ideas in this period may be regarded either (a) as the expression of intellectual and spiritual tendencies and of recognized practical needs, or (b) from the point of view of the actual definitive clearness with which the problems themselves were stated, and solutions offered by educational leaders. In the present outline the attempt is made to indicate the possibilities of the study of the period from the twofold point of view.

5. The purposes of the present outline may now be given a somewhat more formal statement as follows:

(a) by the use of the comparative and historical method,

within a limited area, to indicate what were the more important problems with which the writers on education dealt, and what were the conditions, intellectual and social, which determined the various statements of the problems and the attempts at their solution. Since educational theory is an organic part of the wider history of culture, a syllabus can, at best, indicate in very schematic form the directions and interrelations of the intellectual and spiritual movements of a period to which its educational ideas were organic. Its peculiar danger lies in depriving the period of its natural continuity of movement and life.

(b) to outline the relation of the work of Herbart and of Froebel to its historical setting, and the dependence of their theories upon the philosophical movements of the period. This will necessitate some indication of the philosophical content of Idealism, Romanticism, and Realism.

(c) to indicate the contributions of Herbart and Froebel to a philosophy of education.

6. Before passing on to the outline of the period it may be well for purposes of simplification to indicate in somewhat dogmatic form what are to be regarded as the more important phases of the social problem in the period as a whole:

(a) The period is marked, first of all, by attempts at the reconciliation or adjustment of the two elemental human tendencies, that of individual freedom and collective organization. The worth of the individual and his right to self-realization came to fuller and fuller recognition. This movement at first took the form, for the most part, of reaction against all existing institutions; gradually, however, the lesson was learned that the individual life in itself is naught; only as a member of the great institutions of the race can the individual become truly human, spiritual and free.

✓ (b) The period is marked, in the second place, by a gradual change from mechanical and static to organic and developmental modes of viewing nature and human society. In the place of the atomistic view of things, in politics, philosophy, theology, and education, the organic view of society, of experience, of the entire cosmic process, came to prevail. The mental gaze was transferred from the categories of 'being' to those of 'becoming.'

(c) In the period there may be noted a gradual transformation of the deistic to the theistic view of God's relation to the world. The mechanical Deism gave way to the more immanent and spiritual view of Theism, a view, at times, closely approximating to Pantheism.

(d) Closely connected with the preceding is the new conception of the relation and significance of nature to the human spirit. In place of the view which held to the absolute dualism of nature and spirit came the view of nature as the manifestation of the Absolute and as a medium through which the human spirit attains to self-knowledge and self-realization.

(e) As a final aspect of the social problem during this period may be noted the gradual change from an individualistic ethics to an ethics based upon the demands of the social whole. Closely connected with this, and contributing to it were those ideas and ideals of equality, humanitarianism, of an aristocracy of intelligence rather than birth, and of the new developments in psychological, historical, and physical science, in literature and art, in education and philanthropy. Corresponding to the new religious and ethical ideals there emerged in this transitional period new attitudes to nature, to humanity, to the responsibilities as well as the opportunities of life.

REFERENCES:

The more important sources of material for the study of the period will be indicated in connection with the respective chapters. It is needless to say that *the* important sources are the works of the writers themselves. The study of the period is fundamentally a study of the influence and continuous action of *works on works*. The various lists make no pretension to completeness. They aim to be suggestive merely, not in any sense exhaustive. There are certain books which it is necessary for the student to know if he is to be saved from making discoveries which later turn out to be not discoveries at all. A few of the more important books, which, in addition to the writings of Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, Fichte, Hegel, Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel, naturally form the nucleus of source-material for the study of the period (for the reason that they inevitably become incorporated sooner or later with our idea of the period) are the following:

Boyesen, *Essays on German Literature*; Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*; Dewey, *The Child and the Curriculum*; Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. II; Falckenburg, *History of Modern Philosophy*; Francke, *German Literature as Determined by Social Forces*; Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education* (Part

III); Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*; Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*; Robertson, *A History of German Literature*; Rosenkranz, *The Philosophy of Education*; Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*; Scherer, *A History of German Literature*; Taylor, *Studies in German Literature*; Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. II; Willmann, *Didaktik*; Windelband, *History of Philosophy*; Wundt, *Ethical Systems*.

II

ROUSSEAU AND THE PROBLEM OF CIVILIZATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

1. The dominant tendencies of the intellectual life of the eighteenth century may be indicated as follows:

(a) A movement towards the emancipation of human thought and activity, and the liberation of man from the influence of past dogmas and traditions. The psychology of the 'Enlightenment' contained two fundamental propositions, borrowed from Leibnitz (while omitting the deeper implications of his doctrine): (1) ideas are the constituents of the mental life, and (2) the fundamental difference in mental life is the difference between dark and clear ideas. The 'Enlightenment' of the understanding became the watchword, and to the test of the 'understanding' every belief, institution, creed, must submit or be rejected.

(b) The ideal of Individualism which manifested itself in the prevailing theories of knowledge, of morality, and of human society. In addition to the notion borrowed from Leibnitz that ideas are the *constituent* elements of the mental life, a theory of the *origin* of these ideas had been derived from English Empiricism. A psychology grounded on experience and regarded as the fundamental science became the basis of attack in political, æsthetic, moral, and religious problems. (1) Locke declared, "All knowledge is from experience." Interpreting experience in terms of sensation, and materialistically, the Encyclopædists claimed that we have no knowledge of anything incapable of being experienced by the senses. (2) Pleasure or happiness was regarded as the legitimate end of the individual's action and enlightened selfishness the only rule of conduct.

(c) The prevailing Deism, or the tendency to so-called 'natural religion' of the period. In harmony with the dominant intellectualistic psychology noted above, it was at first argued that Christianity was not mysterious but reasonable, and that the value of religion could not lie in any unintelligible element. Difficulties still remaining, revealed religion came to be questioned and attacked as either superfluous or untrue or both. The outcome among many of the leaders of thought and opinion was either mere toleration of or thoroughgoing opposition to religious beliefs, both natural and revealed.

(d) The belief in a *state of nature* as man's primitive condition, by some writers regarded as a state of human equality, goodness, and happiness. Coupled with this is the ideal of the so-called *return to nature*. (Concerning the notion of a 'state of nature,' see Davidson's *Rousseau*, pp. 3-23.)

(e) The conception of the state or society as the outcome of a social contract consciously and voluntarily entered into by individuals for their own good.

From the preceding analysis it will be seen that the dominant characteristic of the eighteenth century was its individualism and its opposition to the accepted dogmas as well as the actual conditions in church and state: and the work of its representative thinkers and writers was directed chiefly towards the establishment of a new type of philosophy (theoretical and practical), based on the principles of individualism and naturalism. This tendency, indeed, had been gradually but steadily growing and formulating itself through the preceding three centuries. It came to clear consciousness in Rousseau as *the problem of civilization*. Since the Renaissance a new type of civilization and culture had been developing, and at length a voice was raised, asserting the falsity of the whole thing. Rousseau in the modern, as the Sophist in ancient times, was the first clearly to raise the question of the worth of civilization to the life of the individual. In all his writings this fundamental question reappears in one form or another and again and again: What is the value and significance of human history and human civilization for the morality and happiness of the individual? Is it true, indeed, that the growth of human knowledge and the increasing complexity of human relationships, inseparably connected with

so-called civilization, has been for the good of man as man, and made for his true happiness? Does not civilization hinder rather than enhance the happiness as well as the morality of man? In whatever form this question had hitherto expressed itself, back of it all we find the individual coming to a consciousness of himself, of his rights and powers, as independent of what he conceived to be the arbitrary environment which surrounded him. This reaction against authority, now manifest in the Renaissance, now in the Reformation, now in the development of Rationalism, and ultimately in the Revolution, brought the individual into sharp relief. It shows the individual continually becoming more conscious and more determined. The very meaning and significance of society came to be questioned. Is not society a merely artificial product? Does it not merely impede the individual, hinder his development, and thwart his freedom? Is not the individual man, after all, the measure of all things, the criterion of what things are true, and what things are good?

2. When we think of the spirit of the eighteenth century it is the name of Voltaire which almost inevitably comes to mind. When we consider the century by itself it is Voltaire who perhaps best of all embodies and represents the entire period. On the other hand, when we think of the eighteenth as preceding and conditioning in large measure the spiritual history of the nineteenth, it is rather to Rousseau and his work that we must turn.

While it is safe to consider Rousseau (1712-1778) as an epoch-maker in the history of thought, nevertheless to regard his work and that of his contemporaries as an absolute break with the past is to take an inadequate view of the entire movement which it is supposed to constitute. In the evolution of ideas it is difficult to determine just when a particular idea or tendency begins to operate. Failure to recognize the danger of selecting arbitrary starting-points for intellectual and spiritual movements is to lose sight of the essential continuity of human thought and experience. As a social phenomenon *Rousseauism* may be said to have been conditioned in its origin and in its course by the character of the period which had preceded it. It arose, it is true, in what seems a distinctly conscious break with the past. It was intended, indeed, that the past should be sud-

denly superseded, that the (individual should be freed in thought and action.) This very intention, however, had its own historic conditions, its own period of preparation in the past. The movements, therefore, connected with the name of Rousseau, were not altogether suddenly initiated, nor are they yet by any means finished processes. The principles which made them possible were at work in the preceding period, and even now those same principles are being carried to their fuller development.

In estimating the character and influence of Rousseau it is necessary to keep in mind two things: (a) his own nature, (b) his relation to the thought of his times. He was at once original and impressionable—an exponent perhaps more than the originator of ideas. However inconsistent at times his writings may appear, it is not a difficult matter to realize how completely they reveal the nature of the man as well as the character of the times in which he lived.

3. *Rousseau's Writings*.—As has been noted above, the one question fundamental to the thought of Rousseau is *civilization*. Partly owing to his own character and experience, and partly to the influences at work in the life about him, Rousseau became the interpreter or exponent of the tendencies and aspirations, and of the general temper of unrest prevalent in his time, and his writings *critiques* of existing institutions. (1) *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts*, 1750. In 1749 the Academy of Dijon proposed as a theme for a prize-essay the topic, "Has the restoration of the sciences contributed to purify or corrupt manners?" Rousseau's essay won the prize. Henceforth his attitude towards civilization as making for morality and happiness was a negative one. (2) *The Origin of Inequality*, 1753. (3) *The New Heloise*, 1761. An attack on the feudal family: his chief work as an imaginative writer. "The novelty of the book lay," writes Brandes, "in the first instance, in the fact that it gave the death-blow to gallantry, and, consequently, to the theory of the French classical period on the subject of the emotions. This theory was that all noble, fine emotions, and chief among them love, were the products of civilization." Brandes goes on to note more fully the four characteristic features: (i) Love as a natural, not artificial or conventional mannerism. (ii) Inequality in station of the hero and heroine. (iii) The moral

conviction of the sanctity of marriage. (iv) Nature in its literal significance. "For the first time, out of England, we have the genuine feeling for nature in fiction, superseding love-making in drawing-rooms and gardens." (*Main Currents of Literature in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. I. For the influence of Rousseau on Goethe, see p. 20 ff. of the same volume.) (4) *The Social Contract*, 1762. Devoted to the political problem—the sovereignty of the people, the equality of men. "Man is born free but is everywhere in chains." The 'Social Contract' was but a part of a much larger scheme, as projected, of entire social equality. (5) *Émile*, 1763. Devoted to the educational and religious problem. "While others were content with the mere enunciation of maxims and precepts, he breathed into them the spirit of life, and enforced them with a vividness of faith that clothed education with the augustness and unction of religion" (Morley). (6) *Confessions*, 1782. Published four years after his death.

4. *The Social and Ethical Theories of Rousseau*.—(1) The theory of the State of Nature. Since, according to Rousseau, all that is natural, all that is good, all that is fundamentally human, has disappeared with advancing civilization and culture, the only relief for man from such universal degeneracy is to be hoped for from a return to nature on the part of the individual and society alike. And this return is to be achieved through a new type of education and the formation of a state conformed to nature. (2) The theory of the Social Contract. (3) The conception of the 'general will.' (4) Reaction against the Philosophy of the 'Enlightenment'—in psychology, in religion, in æsthetics. (5) Education as the fundamental form of social reconstruction. (See Chap. VI.) (5) In an appreciation and criticism of the doctrines of Rousseau the following points might be noted:

(a) Rousseau did well in forcing upon the reluctant mind of his generation the problem of civilization, its validity and its shortcomings. But the genius and temperament of Rousseau is destructive, rather than creative or reconstructive. While discerning what was transient in the civilization of his day, he was unable to indicate within it that which was of permanent significance for humanity.

(b) While he recalled his generation from a blind worship of the past, yet Rousseau's appreciation of the meaning and significance of history was wholly inadequate. As was to be shown by later writers, the importance of the past lies in its lesson for the present and future. The survival of beliefs, institutions, customs, is an evidence of their significance to the human spirit, and this is to be *estimated*,—not abruptly denied. Rousseau, however, had little, if any, appreciation of the continuity of history.

(c) Rousseau's notion of a 'state of nature' in which are realized both liberty and equality (as he uses the conceptions) seems impossible for man as at present constituted. If you have the one you cannot have the other. In Rousseau's conception of liberty the errors of individualism are set in clear relief. In failing to recognize that human life is essentially social and moral, he confounds mere natural spontaneity with that rational or spiritual freedom which is gained, as Kant maintains, through the limitation and control of mere natural spontaneity or desire in the presence of law. (See also Chaps. III and VI.)

(d) Though not a psychologist in the strict sense of the term, nevertheless Rousseau maintained a psychological attitude towards life, with the result that his works contain the germs of several divergent lines of thought and experience in the succeeding generation. While he was influenced by both Rationalism and Empiricism, yet for him the element of feeling is the central, the fundamental, element in the human mind. In Rousseau, Romanticism in large measure took its rise. "The man who has lived most is not he who has numbered the most years, but he who has the keenest sense of life." It was this element of feeling or passion which made Rousseau's influence a power. He infused into the ideas he accepted from his time this element of passion, and at once they became vital, influential in the minds and hearts of his readers. By vindicating with impassioned eloquence the right of the whole personality of the individual to participate in the solution of its deepest problems, in opposition to the one-sided 'understanding' of the 'Enlightenment,' Rousseau became a pre-Kantian defender of the faith of practical reason. His words found their response in Herder, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Fichte, and Pestalozzi. His emotions were

moreover, extremely complex,—now self-centered and selfish, now, to all appearances, altogether altruistic. He felt keenly the burden of human life in the France of his day, yet he too often regarded it as merely his own. In this passionate exercise of feeling there was something which constantly tended to carry him beyond a purely individualistic view of man, and to a more adequate conception of his relation to nature, to other men and to God than had hitherto prevailed. Although, for example, his notion of religion is still, in the main, deistic, yet connected with it is an emotional element which is an anticipation of a newer conception which was soon to follow. "I believe in God . . . because a thousand motives of preference attract me to the side that is most consoling, and join the weight of hope to the equilibrium of reason." Further his sympathy towards man has within it the promise of better things to come. "It is the common people," he writes, "who compose the human race: what is not the people is so trivial that it is not worth taking into account. Before one who reflects, all civil distinctions disappear; he sees the same passions, the same feelings in the clown as in the man of note and reputation; he only distinguishes their language, and a varnish more or less elaborately laid on." Thus Rousseau's somewhat emotional 'return to nature' had important bearings upon (1) the reaction against mere rationalism in matters of belief, (2) the movement towards democracy with its deeper and wider Humanism and its appreciation of the worth and dignity of man as man, (3) the appreciation of the significance of nature for the human spirit, and of its power to respond and minister to human needs. Rousseau's work, though for the most part destructive, contained within it elements which, later on, inevitably made for social reconstruction.

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Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*; Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*; Brunetière, *History of French Literature*; Davidson, *Rousseau and Education according to Nature*; Dieterich, *Kant und Rousseau*; Fester, *Rousseau und Geschichtsphilosophie*; Hudson, *Rousseau*; Levy-Bruhl, *History of Modern Philosophy in France*; Macdonald, *Studies in the France of Voltaire and Rousseau*; Morley, *Rousseau*; Ritchie, *Natural Rights*; Windelband, *History of Philosophy*; Wundt, *Ethical Systems*.

Further problems for study:

1. Sources of the doctrine of Rousseau.
2. Rousseau's psychology.
3. The concept of 'equality' in the writings of Rousseau.
4. Rousseau's theory of society.
5. The conception of civilization in Rousseau.
6. The conception of the 'general will' in Rousseau.
7. Rousseau's doctrine of nature and culture.
8. Rousseau's relation to Romanticism.
9. Influence of Rousseau on Kant, Goethe, and Pestalozzi.

III

THE TRANSITION PERIOD

1. The eighteenth century, though a period in which there existed a certain tendency to remain self-satisfied with the existing condition of things, was nevertheless in Germany, France, and England fraught with immense possibilities in politics, in industry, in science, in literature, in philosophy, and religion. The age led out beyond itself in many directions. In Germany, during the last quarter of the century especially, it became an era of transition in which new aspirations, new ideas of life and conduct became formative in the minds and hearts of men. In philosophy, literature and theology is found during this period the most fruitful contribution of Germany, where the period of transition took the form of intellectual rather than political or industrial revolution.

✓2. Without any attempt at completeness the following characteristics may be noted as the more important for the present purpose: (1) Its struggle for truth and the strengthening of the critical insight. (2) Its opposition of the original force and simplicity of nature to the artificial forms of culture and society. (3) The gradual prevalence of organic over mechanical modes of thinking, leading to new conceptions of God's relation to the world, of the interrelations of men and the relation and significance of nature to the spiritual life. (4) A tendency towards individualism and an emphasis of the subjective, personal aspect of truth, and an unceasing search for fresh spiritual life and light in art and literature, in philosophy and religion. (5) The struggle for freedom of conscience, the deepening of the

sense of the value of the individual, his right to self-realization, an ideal of human advancement through individual self-culture. Coupled with this is a new *Humanism* in literature, art, and moral theory.

3. (a) *Lessing* (1729-1781) as *Pathfinder*, "a man who, while combining in himself the enlightenment, the idealism, the universality of the best of his age, added to this an intellectual fearlessness and a constructive energy which have made him the champion destroyer of despotism, and the master builder of lawful freedom" (Francke). The forerunner of classical German literature—Principal works—(1) *Minna von Barnhelm*, *Emilia Galotti*, *Nathan the Wise*, and *The Education of the Human Race*; (2) *Hamburg Dramaturgy*, and *Laocoon*. Their political, æsthetic, ethical, and religious significance—Embodiments of those movements which were to make for human freedom, for social reconstruction and consolidation.

(b) In Lessing may be noted (1) the influence of the transitional period in which he lived. Neither the *orthodoxy*, the *pietism*, nor the *rationalism* of his day completely satisfied him. No radical innovator, Lessing aimed at a *gradual transformation of the existing state of things*. Through his attempts at literary and artistic reform, his search for the true lines of social progress, his demand for religious freedom, he became in his century a unique representative of the movement, not merely of emancipation but of reconstruction. (2) A passionate love of truth, a demand for freedom of thought and conscience and the conception of eternal striving as the true duty of man. "Not the truth of which any one is, or supposes himself to be, possessed, but the upright endeavor he has made to arrive at truth, makes the worth of a man. For not by the possession, but by the investigation, of truth are his powers expanded, wherein alone his ever-growing perfection consists. Possession makes us easy, indolent, proud.—If God held all truth shut in His right hand, and in His left hand nothing but the ever-restless instinct for truth, though with the condition of forever and ever erring, and should say to me, 'Choose!'—I should bow humbly to His left hand, and say, 'Father, give! pure truth is for Thee alone.'" (Compare the ideas of Goethe, Kant, and Fichte.) (3) Closely connected with the idea of eternal striving is his possession of the historical sense,

his anticipation of the idea of organic growth and its resultant optimism. (4) A combination of cosmopolitan toleration and nationalism, an ideal of freedom whose foundations are laid in discipline, an individualism resting on habits of self-control and self-surrender. (5) The conception of feeling as the fundamental element of the psychical life. (6) The accordance of his views of God, the world and the human soul with those of Leibnitz. The idea of inner connection between nature and history. For Lessing, influenced by Spinoza, there exists an immanent rather than transcendent relation between God and the world, and reality as a whole is in a ceaseless process of becoming and development. God does not exist apart from the world: He is to be conceived, rather, as the soul of the world. (7) Influence of Lessing upon Herder and Goethe.

(c) In *The Education of the Human Race* (1780), perhaps the most suggestive of his writings, which is closely connected in many ways with *Nathan the Wise*, which preceded it, Lessing formulates his general ethical and philosophical position in the form of an ideal of religion,—of a new gospel. In this brief treatise is found an application of the Leibnitzian idea of development to the history of positive religions. The history of the various religions of the world is *an education of the human race through divine revelation*. In them we are not to find mere blind striving and error, but rather the only road by which the human mind in each instance has been able to develop, and along which it will develop still farther. What education is to the individual man, revelation is to the whole human race. By means of revelation the human race is raised from lower to higher stages. Every individual must traverse the same course as that by which the race attains its perfection; and just as the education of the individual puts nothing foreign or extraneous into him, but merely puts him in possession more quickly of that which he could have reached for himself, so is human reason illuminated by revelation concerning things to which it could have attained by its own unaided efforts, only that without the divine coöperation the process would have been infinitely more arduous and prolonged.

4. In Herder's interpretation of nature and history there may be noted: (a) Certain general characteristics of the mind and

work of Herder (1744-1803) which served to give him an influential place in the movement of ideas in this era of transition: (1) Endowed with wonderful spiritual vitality, deep feeling, profound interpretative power, Herder was able to vitalize the intellectual life of his time as was perhaps no other writer of the period. Compared with that of Kant, his mind was of the synthetic, the formative, rather than of the analytic or critical type. "Life, Love, Light," the words written on his tomb and on the statue at Weimar, embody the spirit and the spiritual aspirations of Herder. (2) In his refinement of the philosophy of feeling, of its basal character in the personal life, against the demand of mere reason or understanding, Herder may be regarded as a forerunner of Romanticism in Germany, as was Rousseau in France. He resembled the Romanticists also in his inability to keep his poetic, his philosophic and his religious ideas apart. (3) Through his study of primitive poetry and, notably, by his essay on Ossian, Herder taught the value of the poetry of the people as contrasted with that of the cultured. (4) As one who had in early life received much inspiration from Rousseau, Herder was a strong defender of the claims of nature, freedom, and the right of the individual to self-realization. From the point of view of ethics, he maintains against Kant, his former teacher, that the end of life must lie in the particular and individual rather than merely in the race. To each individual is allotted such development and perfection as is possible at the given stage. Yet Herder recognizes that this development is rendered possible only through (i) reciprocal action between individuals, and (ii) transmission of the acquired means of culture from generation to generation. It is this interrelation between individuals and generations which produces humanity and renders a philosophy of history possible. In the work of Herder as a whole there are the seemingly contradictory tendencies,—to hold fast equally to individualism and to collectivism, and, indeed, to pantheism.

(b) Herder's *Ideas for a Philosophy of History of Mankind* was published between 1784-1791. This work, with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, gives utterance to the most important intellectual drift of the last century. In this book, says Pfeleiderer, meet, as in a focus, the combined results of Herder's various philo-

sophical labors, labors which opened up new and magnificent points of view especially in those branches of study which were depreciated by Kant, viz., the emotional side of the life of the human soul and the development of mankind under the combined action of the natural and spiritual forces in history.

In an analysis of Herder's *Ideas* the following points should be noted: (1) His aim is to explain human evolution as ultimately an outcome of man's physical environment. Man is to be viewed as a part of nature—nature's last child, her first freed-man—and his various forms of development as purely natural processes. In man is the meeting-point of the physical and ethical series. Kant, on the other hand, whom Herder opposed, viewed human evolution as the gradual manifestation of a growing faculty of rational free-will, and opposed it to the operations of physical nature. (2) He asserts the interconnection according to law of all things in nature and history. This presupposes a ground of unity in existence. "God is everything in His works." (3) In his conception of development Herder is dominated by Spinoza, Rousseau and Leibnitz. To Spinoza he owed much of his monistic conception of things, the unity of God and the world, of nature and spirit. With Rousseau, he lays stress on the earlier stages of human development, since because of their simpler and more spontaneous character (*cf.* Schiller) they appear to him the more real and valuable. His doctrine of organic forces is a transformation of Leibnitz's theory of monads. These forces, after the fashion of the active force in our thought, operate in different degrees and at various stages through all nature, which forms one vast organism. Even in unconscious nature, ideal forces unceasingly operate and organize in accordance with definite types. The lower forms of life prefigure man in unequal degrees of imperfection. (4) Since the development of man is to be explained in connection with his environment, his mental faculties are to be viewed in relation to his organization and as developed under the pressure of the necessities of life. The great law of nature is that everywhere on earth everything be realized that can be realized there: its end,—humanity and the development of human capacities. Preceding abstract thought there was the religious consciousness of the invisible forces in nature.

Reason is not innate: it is a product. Our thoughts have been acquired through tradition, speech, environmental influences. Man comes into the world to learn reason. This is nothing, Herder claims, other than something acquired, a proportion and direction of ideas and faculties which we must learn, and to which man, *according to his organization and way of life*, must be educated. The individual becomes man only through a process of education, and education proceeds through the participation of the individual in the life of the race.

5. (a) Kant (1724-1804) once declared that, after all, the greatest, and perhaps sole, use of philosophy is merely negative, and, instead of discovering truth, has only the more modest merit of preventing error. His own work resolves itself into a *critical* account of the nature, possibility and limits of human experience. Starting from the accepted order of nature and the moral order acknowledged in the conviction of duty, Kant seeks to answer the question, What do these imply? His account is embodied in the three Critiques: (1) the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), presenting an epistemological view of experience, (2) the *Critique of the Practical Reason* (1788), in which Kant develops an ethical interpretation of experience on the basis of results reached in the epistemological, (3) the *Critique of Judgment* (1790), in which the attempt is made to develop an æsthetic and teleological interpretation of the world.

(b) In attempting to give a reasonably adequate statement of important factors in the work of Kant it would be necessary to give an analysis of the following: (1) his relation to Empiricism (Hume), to Rationalism (Leibnitz), to Dualism (Descartes), and to Naturalism (Rousseau); (2) the meaning of the *critical* method; (3) the significance of *the problem of the possibility of experience*; (4) the distinction between the *matter* and *form* of knowledge; (5) the nature of the three fundamental forms, space, time, causation, as *functions* of human intelligence; (6) the doctrine of the categories; (7) the doctrine of freedom; (8) the categorical imperative; (9) the Kantian doctrine of personality; (10) the interpretation of the adaptation of nature to intelligence. In this connection it is only possible to indicate very briefly the outcome of *the Kantian theory of knowledge*.

(c) Kant's Epistemology. Kant's question is, in brief, What is *experience*, what does it involve, and how do we get knowledge by means of it? The point of view of the common consciousness and of Empiricism is that whatever is known by experience exists full-formed and complete before it is experienced, and that knowledge consists in the passive apprehension of this pre-existent world of objects. On the other hand, Kant insists that knowledge and therefore experience is possible through the co-operation of two faculties,—sense and understanding. Both are absolutely essential. Through *sense* the objects—the matter—of knowledge, are given; through *understanding* they are thought, formed, or understood, *i. e.*, become real objects of knowledge. As for Plato and Aristotle, so for Kant the “sensible” is, properly speaking, no “thing” at all, but capable of becoming something through the determining action of thought. Thus Kant attempts a reconciliation between Empiricism and Rationalism, admitting with the Empiricist that *sense* must furnish the *material* or empirical element of knowledge, while with the Rationalist he contends that the *understanding* must furnish its necessary and universal *form*. Not that by sense an object is given as a determined object, for all determination comes from the understanding. All that is meant is that the material, the chaos of sensations, is furnished by sense, to be determined through the *categories* of the understanding. Thus a knowledge of determined objects is gained through the joint operation of sense and understanding.

For Kant, therefore, the problem of philosophy resolves itself, first of all, into a *theory of knowledge*. The theory of knowledge developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the necessary basis and real presupposition of the views regarding ethics and the philosophy of religion which are developed in the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*. For Kant, as was implied in the preceding paragraph, the peculiar *note* of experience is the *connectedness* of perceptions, or the reference of individual presentations of sense to the unity of the object or thing known. The essential fact in knowledge is synthesis. Every judgment of experience contains synthesis. This synthesis implies, according to Kant, four things: (1) a

manifold of sense which is combined; (2) the forms (space and time) in which this manifold is received; (3) the forms (the categories, whose supreme condition is the unity of apperception) under which the manifold so received is cognized; (4) the unity of consciousness itself (the 'static and permanent ego'). The 'static and permanent ego' is the presupposition of all connected experience. The mind is something more than a passive thing, a mere creature of environment. For Kant, accordingly (and this is how he meets Hume), the modes of synthesis by which the given manifold of sense is reduced to the unity of self-consciousness *are at the same time the modes of objective existence*. That is to say, self-consciousness is impossible apart from its object, apart from the orderly, systematic connection of phenomena which we call experience.

Starting provisionally from the ordinary dualism of thought and things, by a gradual transformation of the theory Kant arrived at the conclusion that the only way of accounting for the endless order of nature is that it is one which our own intelligence forges; that, instead of our passively receiving or apprehending objects (which the Empiricists had maintained as the sole condition of our ordered experience), it is rather, says Kant, by our intelligence alone that known objects are constituted. Our "experience" must forever remain unaccounted for and unexplained so long as we remain in the belief that *thought* and *nature*, the *rational* and the *sensible*, are abstract opposites. The point of view, then, which Kant would have us take is this, that the science of being and the science of knowledge are organically one and inseparable. The question whether Kant consistently maintained himself in this position will be referred to in a subsequent section.

On this basis the Kantian theory of knowledge would seem to imply that the relation between subject and object, mind and matter, is one of *organic identity*, and not of mechanical separation and opposition. The recognition that consciousness is a necessary element in all that is *for* it, and that *existence is existence for a self*, is at once the discovery that the object of knowledge is phenomenal, and at the same time it is the discovery of the noumenon of which it is the phenomenal: *consciousness*, in other words, *in the very act of being conscious*

transcends the dualism between itself and its object. Just here is to be found the starting-point of post-Kantian metaphysics,—a metaphysics based upon the generalization of the Kantian cognitive consciousness. For to admit with Kant that all existence is existence *for a self* is to admit a principle the complement of which became the fundamental doctrine of post-Kantian Idealism, namely, that all existence is the *manifestation of a self*,—that subject and object, spirit and nature, the self and the world, are not isolated, self-existent entities, but move and have their being in the persisting purpose of one immanent, absolute, spiritual life.

(d) Kant's *Ethical Theory*. For analysis and criticism of Kant's ethical theory see Bradley, *Ethical Studies* (iv); Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II; Dewey, *The Study of Ethics*, A Syllabus, sec. 36; Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*; Schurman, *Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution*; Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, Book III. Note especially Kant's doctrine in relation to (1) the unconditional character of morality, (2) the autonomy of obligation, (3) antithesis of reason and feeling, of the 'noumenal' self, setting up the ideal of action and effort, and the 'phenomenal' self, made up of feelings and impulses which furnish the materials of volition—man as 'natural' and as 'intelligible' being, (4) freedom as an endowment rather than, as with Fichte, a spiritual achievement through development and work, (5) self-consciousness as the source of moral responsibility, (6) 'the good will,' (7) society as a 'kingdom of ends,' (8) the duties of self-preservation and self-development, (9) the law of reason as the fundamental law of nature, *i. e.*, the rational and spiritual principle revealed in human nature, the constitutive principle of the reality of the world as a whole.

(e) For our present purpose it will suffice to indicate in schematic form the more prominent results of Kant's inquiries: (1) The true critical method is the very opposite of that easy-going scepticism which regards a solution of the questionings of human reason as impossible. *Reason must be credited with the power to answer the questions to which it has itself given rise.* This *critical method* has permanent significance for the study of philosophy, art and literature, religion and human institutions. (2) Everything is derived from experience except the capacity

for experience. Herein lies the possibility of education and of the direction of personal development. (3) Personal experience, however, is not a stream of isolated sensations, but an organic unity, united by self-consciousness, and formally determined by the nature of the thinking subject. Each individual, by his own mental processes, builds up his own world of inner experience. (4) The individual is no mere knowing machine set in mechanical juxtaposition over against a world independent of intelligence: rather as an intelligent self he finds himself in the midst of an intelligible world, related and adapted to intelligence, bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh. For Kant objective consciousness becomes real only when it becomes subjective: self-consciousness, likewise, becomes real only when it finds an object through which it can realize itself. Thus the self and its object are equally the results of a process. Back of the distinction between the self and the object there is the experience process. The consciousness of the object and the consciousness of the self issue in their difference from a common source; and the consciousness of the object is an essential element in the consciousness of the self. Herein is Kant's interpretation of the place of nature (the objective world) in the evolution of intelligence. (5) In keeping with the results reached in his epistemological inquiry, in the ethical interpretation of experience, Kant finds the law for man's right action not in anything foreign or external to him but in man's innermost nature. This innermost essence of man is will. The fact of the existence of morality or duty is sufficient evidence for Kant that reason prescribes ends for itself. The realization of duty, moreover, would be impossible for a being who is not conceived of as free or capable of self-determination. In obedience to the moral law, *the fundamental fact in ethics and religion*, man finds proof of his freedom and of his membership in a moral order of the world. Thus for Kant personality is central,—personality not in isolation as with Rousseau, but in a society of moral beings united by the law of duty. The end of life is not happiness but work in the service of humanity. (6) Intellectual development, because of its evident limitations in relation to the deeper needs of the spiritual life, is less directly significant than the cultivation of the feeling of reverence for the moral law and of a never-

ending aspiration towards its realization. The moral law is the central truth in Kant's world and is for him the essential element in human education.

6. (a) Goethe (1749-1832), and Schiller (1759-1805), together with Kant, the heroic figures in German culture—Reasons for not including the work of Goethe and Schiller in the Romantic Movement—Goethe's individuality—His lyrical poetry a sincere expression of his inner life and a faithful reflection of his intellectual and moral development—Influence of Rousseau, Lessing, Herder and Schiller—The *romantic* and the *classical* influences—His works as "fragments of a great confession"—*Faust* as autobiographical—The adjustment of the individual and collective ideals in Goethe's life and writings—Goethe as the apostle of self-culture—Arnold's judgment of Goethe, "the greatest poet of modern times . . . because he was by far our greatest modern man," compared with Richard Holt Hutton's, "Goethe was the wisest man of modern days, who ever lacked the wisdom of a child; the deepest who never knew what it was to kneel in the dust with bowed head and a broken heart."—"I find a provision," says Emerson, "in the constitution of the world, for the writer or secretary, who is to report the doings of the miraculous spirit of life that everywhere throbs and works. His office is a reception of the facts into the mind, and then a selection of the eminent and characteristic experiences."

(b) Schiller—"A hundred years may roll away, another and yet another, still from century to century his name shall be celebrated, and at last there shall come a festival when men will say: See! There was a truth in his ideal anticipations of freedom and civilization"—Three stages in Schiller's development, (1) eudæmonism, (2) pessimism, (3) altruism. In the two earlier stages Schiller was under the influence of Rousseau (see *The Robbers*, a protest against the social and political forces of the time; also *Ode to Rousseau*, the six poems addressed to Laura, and *Resignation*)—Influence of Goethe and Kant—Opposition to Romanticism—Bias for historical subjects—"His ever-aspiring genius"—The poem *The Ideal* an embodiment of Schiller's philosophical and artistic creed.

(c) In the present outline only three of Goethe's works are considered,—*Faust*, *Wilhelm Meister*, *The Elective Affinities*. The

spiritual, *i. e.*, educational, significance of these are indicated more fully in Chapter VI. For the present, attention may be called to several points to be noted: (1) The true significance and ethical import of *Faust* can be realized only when the two parts are regarded as integral elements of one organic whole; (2) The tendency to symbolism; (3) Goethe's conception of nature; (4) Religious mysticism; (5) The thirst for truth a divine impulse; "Ye shall not prevail"; (6) The fatalism of passion; (7) The *community* of human life; (8) The possibility of moral restoration. In these three works Goethe treats the problem of the individual. *Faust* is a glorification of individual culture consecrated to the service of humanity. *Wilhelm Meister* is a record of the incidents in the development of a soul from immaturity to a conscious recognition of a world order. *The Elective Affinities* deals with the conflict between human instinct and the moral order of the world. Over against the destructive work of Rousseau, by which Goethe was so strongly influenced in his youth, stands the second part of *Faust* as a "triumphal song of civilization." Over against the *Émile*, with its glorification of education through isolation, is set the *Wilhelm Meister*, in which every individual is called upon to cultivate himself in order that he may enter (indeed, *only through entering*) into his heritage of the wisdom of the race. "*Wilhelm Meister*," writes Dr. Harris, "*utters the watchword of this epoch in which we find ourselves.*"

(d) Schiller's early ethical ideas betray the influence of Rousseau. Soon through the study of Greek art and life the Rousseau idea of an unrestrained life according to nature gave place to the conception of an harmonious, self-determined development of the personal life. Later Schiller came under the influence of Kant, whose insistence upon the supremacy of the ideal over natural instincts made a lasting impression upon him. "The deep, fundamental ideas of the idealistic philosophy," so he wrote, "are an abiding treasure." He was now forced, however, to seek an adjustment of his ethical and his æsthetic creed. Schiller develops his ideas in close relation to the problem of culture in his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795)—a development of the fundamental idea of the poem *Die Künstler*. Antagonism between the moral and the sensuous is a sign of imperfect culture. Only through æsthetic

education can the problem be solved. This perfect adjustment will one day be attained in play,—in which man is truly man, self-active, self-determined, obedient to law, the sensuous nature not suppressed. Thus for Schiller artistic activity or the play impulse mediates between the sensuous impulse and the rational element in the cultured man, uniting the two in harmonious co-operation. Neither lust nor moral worth won through obedience to the stern law of duty is beautiful. Beauty and grace are not won through the triumph of one, nor in the suppression of the other. The perfect woman and children reveal the perfection, the original destiny of man. "Deep meaning oft lies hid in childish play." (In addition to the *Letters on Aesthetic Education*, see also, *Die vier Weltalter*, *Der Pilgrim*, *Das Ideal und das Leben*, *Das Mädchen aus der Fremde*, *Der spielende Knabe*, *Das Eleusische Fest*, *Lied von der Glocke*. Francke's interpretation of the spiritual significance of Schiller's ideals as embodied in his five great historical dramas should be noted.)

REFERENCES:

In addition to the works of the writers mentioned, the following general references may be added: (1) Lessing and Herder: Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*; Francke, *German Literature as Determined by Social Forces*; Höffding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II; Nevison, *Herder and his Times*; Rolleston, *Life of Lessing* (with bibliography); Scherer, *History of German Literature*; Sime, *Life and Writings of Lessing*; Taylor, *Studies in German Literature*; Windelband, *History of Philosophy*. (2) Kant: In addition to various histories of modern philosophy, the treatises of Adamson, Caird, Kuno Fischer, Paulsen, Wallace and Watson may be consulted. (3) Goethe and Schiller: Blackie, *The Wisdom of Goethe*; Boyesen, *Goethe and Schiller*; Carlyle, *Critical and Miscellaneous Essays*; Davidson, *Philosophy of Faust*; Dowden, *New Studies in Literature*; *English Goethe Society Publications*; Fischer, *Schiller-Schriften*; Francke, *German Literature*; Harris, *The Lesson of Goethe's Faust*; Hillebrand, *German Thought*; Lewes, *Life of Goethe*; Nevison, *Life of Schiller* (with bibliography); Scherer, *History of German Literature*; Seeley, *Goethe Reviewed after Sixty Years*; Sime, *Life of Goethe* (with bibliography); Snider, *Commentary on Faust*; Taylor, *Studies in German Literature*; Thomas, *Life and Works of Friedrich Schiller*; Ueberweg, *Schiller als Historiker und Philosoph*.

Further problems for study:

1. Lessing's reconciliation of *freedom* and *discipline*.
2. Lessing's principles of æsthetic criticism.
3. Influence of (a) Lessing on Herder, (b) Lessing and Herder on Goethe.
4. Comparison of Lessing's *Education of the Human Race* and Temple's *Education of the World* (in *Essays and Reviews*).
5. Kant's conception of a 'person.'
6. The autonomous nature of obligation in the Kantian Ethics.
7. The individual and social elements in Kant's ethical theory.
8. The development of psychological theory from Rousseau to Kant.
9. Goethe's conception of nature.
10. Goethe's ideal of culture as illustrated in *Faust* and *Wilhelm Meister*.
11. Schiller's conception of *æsthetic* education.
12. Schiller's theory of play.

IV

ROMANTICISM

1. In the present section *Romanticism* is used to cover a twofold movement: (1) an expansion of the *revolutionary individualism* and *naturalism*, which may be said to have had its beginnings in Rousseau, (2) a reactionary and reconstructive movement towards a *collectivistic* ideal of life,—an ideal which, from the philosophical point of view, found its most organic expression in the work of Hegel. The development of Romanticism—as designating a particular period of time—may thus be said to extend from the emergence of Rousseau in 1749 to the death of Hegel in 1831. These dates will serve our present purpose as convenient marks of identification. The second of the tendencies noted above was not wholly subsequent to the first; it was, perhaps, in large measure. Frequently, however, the two tendencies are to be found side by side in the writings of the single author.

2. As is implied in the preceding section, Romanticism, in the course of its evolution, was intimately related to and influenced by the individualistic naturalism of Rousseau and the idealistic movement begun by Kant, more fully developed by Fichte and Schelling, and carried to its completion by Hegel.

Rousseau's *naturalism* and *individualism* embodied for the men of his generation the conviction (1) of the worth and rights of man as man and (2) of the ministry of nature to the human spirit. This first element of Romanticism, its tendency to naturalistic individualism, coming in contact with the idealistic movement with its organic modes of thought, was modified and transformed in, at least, a threefold manner,—in its relation to (1) man, (2) nature, (3) the Absolute. In place of the atomism of an earlier day there was evolved a conception according to which the self and the world, civilization and nature, the divine and the human, became parts of one organic spiritual life or process.

3. The individualistic and naturalistic aspect of Romanticism is evidenced by (1) the reaction against social and political authority, the hatred of tyranny of whatever kind, the dualism of nature and culture; (2) a high development of imaginative sensibility, frequently bordering on sentimentalism; (3) an exaltation of feeling as fundamental and supreme, to be recognized in the conviction that intuition should supply the deficiencies of reason, that religion is based on feeling, that impulse and 'natural instincts' are the surest guides to truly artistic action; in the lyrical and personal note of literature; in the 'storm and stress' mood, with its melancholy, its exaggerated self-consciousness, its frequent tendency towards the morbid; (4) a melancholy love of nature, opposing nature to man; preferring the solitary, the wild, the terrible, the mysterious; idealizing the simple, unconventional ways of childhood; (5) a revolt against classical traditions and methods, demanding and suggesting joy in emotion, in color, sound, movement, the sense of freedom, rather than in classical precision of thought or form; (6) a passionate aspiration, finding expressing in the assurance of something nobler and truer than the present; in the desire for a free and harmonious development of human nature; in a vague nature-worship, a mystical pantheism, a yearning, human tenderness, a longing for intellectual excitement, and the desire to penetrate the unknown and the unseen, for beauty haunted by strangeness and mystery; in a passion for the past,—the romantic past of myth, of legend, of chivalry.

4. This individualistic phase of Romanticism, with its as-

sertion of the rights of man, its revolt against the traditional and conventional; its exaltation of feeling as supreme, its development of imaginative sensibility, its self-consciousness, its egotism, its melancholy; its contempt for the present, its passion for the past, its renascence of wonder, of mystery, of chivalry; its universalism rather than its nationalism; its passionate conviction of the possible harmonies between the truly natural man and the life of nature, of the beauty of childhood, and the dignity of the solitary peasant; its nature-worship and its pantheism; its belief in a nobler and better form of life somewhere beyond this present real,—all these tended to carry it beyond itself to a more spiritual and idealistic point of view,—to a view of the world and life, indeed, which made Romanticism complementary to Idealism in initiating much that is best in the intellectual and spiritual life of the present. Certain of the more important factors making for what was spoken of in a preceding section as the tendency in Romanticism towards a collectivistic ideal of life may be briefly noted: (1) The gradual prevalence of organic over mechanical modes of thought. (Compare, *e. g.*, Herder's conception of the relation of nature to man; Kant's doctrine of experience as an organic unity with reason as its constituent factor, leading to an idealism which finds in the manifold forms of human self-expression the manifestation of free, spiritual life and purpose; Fichte's doctrine of the will as fundamental, and the medium of its realization, the common life of man; Goethe's belief in the divine immanence in nature and humanity; Schleiermacher's conception of the individual in organic relation to the world; Hegel's conception of human institutions as forming one vast spiritual organism whose ultimate goal is the realization of the kingdom of God.) (2) The resultant reconstruction of the doctrine of personality. The freedom and the realization of the individual were no longer conceived of as the unhindered expression of natural instinct, but as spiritual achievements, won through self-limitation in the presence of ideal ends. (3) As a result of the return to nature in literature and life, the prevalence of the organic mode of thought, the deepening of imaginative sensibility, not only did man draw near to nature, but nature was brought into a more living unity with the human spirit, and to

man was disclosed nature, not as a mere alien something, an unknown thing-in-itself, but that in which intelligence finds its object, a reflection of its own activity, a medium through which human activities reveal themselves, a source of beauty and delight, a ministry to spiritual needs. (4) As a further resultant of the organic mode of thought meeting with the Romantic *passion for the past*, its wistful yearning for the days gone by, coupled with its demand for closer vision and clearer knowledge, the past was brought into more vital relation to the present, and this in turn gave rise to an appreciation of the *continuity* of phenomena in science, in æsthetics and literature, in politics, in history, philosophy and theology. (Concerning the position of evolutionary theory during this period, see Osborne, *From the Greeks to Darwin*; Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, chap. ix; Sully, art. *Evolution* in *Encyclopædia Britannica*.) (5) The increasing fear of the tyranny of mere "reason," the reaction due to the social and political crisis in German life, had not only excited the feeling of nationality, but had quickened it into a passion, especially in such minds as Fichte, Schiller, Schleiermacher, Arndt, Körner and Uhland. The work of these in turn had its foundations in those ideals of life and duty enforced by Lessing, Herder, Kant and Goethe. (6) The liberating influence in the spiritual life of Germany of the study of Greek literature and art; of Shakespeare and Milton. (7) Along with the organic mode of thought there came as one of its manifestations a new conception of the divine immanence in the world, compelling "all new successions to the forms they wear," investing all things in nature, in art, in life, with a sense of the infinite, the unfathomable, the wonderful, yet ever with the possibility of familiar comradeship between them and the human soul. "I can no longer," said Lessing, "be satisfied with the conception of a God out of the world," and Goethe:

"Whom I own for Father, God, Creator,
Holds nature in himself, himself in nature,
And in his kindly arms embraced, the whole
Doth live and move by his pervading soul."

5. The more prominent members of what is strictly known as the 'Romantic School' were August Schlegel (1767-1845), and

his brother, Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), who by their critical writings did much to strengthen the Romantic tendency; Ludwig Tieck (1773-1853), the dramatist and man of letters; Novalis (1772-1801), and Schelling (1765-1854), its typical philosophers; Schleiermacher (1768-1834), the philosophic theologian of the movement. Friedrich Schlegel held that "the French Revolution, Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, and Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* are the greatest tendencies of the age. The man who takes offence at this juxtaposition, to whom no Revolution can appear great which is not noisy and material, has not yet risen to the high and wide standpoint of the history of man." (For an account of *Romanticism* in its critical and literary aspects especially, but still as influencing philosophic speculation profoundly, see Francke, *German Literature*; Omond, *The Romantic Triumph*; Scherer, *German Literature*; also, Haym, *Die romantische Schule*; Hettner, *Die romantische Schule*; Schmidt, *Geschichte der Romantik*; also, *Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur seit Lessings Tod*.)

6. In the study of the philosophy of Romanticism the genesis of the romantic *Weltanschauung* may be discovered in (1) a certain dissatisfaction, felt by Fichte, Schelling, and others who were fundamentally followers of Kant, with the Kantian view of experience as a whole. Through the Kantian *analysis*, it was believed, the living unity of the spiritual life had not been preserved. On the other hand, the deepest element in the Kantian system was the thought of synthesis, of self-activity as the essence of spirit. The question was asked, most persuasively by Fichte, Should not this fundamental element, the spontaneity, the synthetic activity of spirit, be made the point of departure in philosophical construction? Would not atomism, isolation, externality disappear, if all things in the world of nature (Schelling) and in the life of man (Fichte) could be shown as manifestations of one Life or Spirit operative in them? (2) The revival of the study of Spinoza, Leibnitz, Bruno, Böhme, who inspired such as Herder, Goethe, Schelling, Schleiermacher and Novalis with an enthusiasm for nature and the world conceived as an organic whole. (3) The belief that truth is revealed not in reason alone, but in the feelings and intuitions of the human soul. (4) The development of the sciences and the growth of

the idea of the unity of nature. [Important names are Lavoisier (1743-1794), Humboldt (1769-1859), Goethe (1749-1832)]. (5) The new conception of history. (6) The development of a new content in the religious consciousness. (7) The growth of a new and more spiritual type of art criticism and interpretation. (8) The growing disinclination clearly to distinguish between æsthetic, philosophic and religious ideas. Novalis, for example, declared that the separation between poetry and philosophy is superficial and ingenious.

7. For Schelling's relation to Fichte and Hegel, see Chapter V. In a study of his relation to Romanticism, note: (1) His work a *spirit*—an outcome of poetical intuition; a *tendency of thought* rather than a system. (2) Nature not, as for Fichte, a mere abstract limit to the infinite striving of spirit, but the manifestation of one formative energy or soul. Nature and spirit complementary parts of a unitary process. "The system of nature is at the same time the system of our spirit. Nature is visible spirit; spirit is invisible nature." (3) His attempt at the reconciliation of opposites or differences within nature and mind. As in nature are exhibited the dynamic stages or processes in the struggle of spirit towards consciousness, so in the world of mind are disclosed the manifold stages through which self-consciousness, with its opposites and reconciliations, struggles towards its ideals. (4) His symbolism, and his application of organic conceptions to the various levels of existence. [Compare, also, the work of his disciples: Carus (1789-1869), Oersted (1777-1851), Oken (1779-1851), Steffens (1773-1845).]

8. (a) In the study of the work of Schleiermacher there should be noted: (1) Its union of critical reflection, appreciation of historical method, philosophic breadth, moral intensity, and devotional spirit. (2) Its adherence, for the most part, to the general world-view of Romanticism, which attempts to grasp in one homogeneous form the entire content of life. (3) Its theory that philosophy finds the best guarantee of its truth in the religious conviction it engenders. (4) The idea of God, as the unity of thought and being, underlying human knowledge as its presupposition. (5) Its conviction that the innermost life of man must be lived in feeling, and that this, and this alone can bring man into immediate relation to the Highest. Religion

consists in the *immediate* consciousness that all finite things exist in and through the infinite: all things temporal in and through the eternal. (6) Since religion is conceived as that which affords the highest point of view, ("giving to life its music") or rather as the fundamental mode of our participation in the spiritual life, it follows that intellectual, moral and æsthetic culture can attain their perfection only when they lead back to living in the immediate feeling of the infinite as that which surrounds and supports all finite individualities, all finite existence. It is not to be understood that this religious feeling is purely passive, or *æsthetic* religiousness: rather its true form is *teleological* religiousness whose highest form is labor for the advancement of the kingdom of God. (7) Its emphasis on the positive significance of the individual. Each man should express humanity in his own way and with a unique blending of its elements.

(b) Schleiermacher's *theory of nature and ethics*: (1) Schleiermacher recognizes, first of all, an antithesis between the real and ideal, organism and intelligence, nature and reason. The opposition is, however, not absolute, since in life both elements are united. Underlying nature is universal reason as organizing principle. Attaining to consciousness in man Reason finds itself partly in conflict, partly in harmony with nature. There is always a relative harmony. The end and aim of human thought and activity is to lessen the extent of this opposition between man and the world. Consciousness itself, with its union of antithetic elements, is proof that the reconciliation is not hopeless. Back of nature and mind is a unity, a life, the common ground of nature and humanity, the principle of knowledge, the presupposition of the ethical life of man, a life whose best witness is the religious consciousness. (2) Starting with the (apparent) dualism of ego and non-ego, Schleiermacher conceives the life of man to consist in their interaction, its infinite goal, their interpenetration. The ego is body and soul in one. The *organization* of the self has its rational aspect: the *reason*, its organic element. Every extension of consciousness is higher life: individuality increases through increasing participation in the life of nature and humanity. The metaphysical basis of the ethical life was noted above, namely, the ultimate unity of

nature and reason; its psychological basis is found in the impulse of reason to organize nature—the human body as well as outer nature—as the instrument of its purposes. Thus ethical development stands to nature in the relation of reciprocal action. The ethical process is twofold: (i) an organizing principle, through which man attempts to make himself *master of nature*, (ii) a symbolizing activity through which he seeks to *give expression to his spiritual life*. Thus for Schleiermacher the entire development of human culture is a part of the ethical development of man. The *organizing* activity produces the forms of property and of human intercourse: the *symbolizing* activity gives rise to the poetic and artistic expressions of feeling, and the manifold forms of science: the united products constitute the triumphs or achievements of humanity as reason, in a word, civilization, and thus *spiritual intercourse and the social conditions of moral action*. The individual, as an *individualization of universal reason*, attains moral worth according as he positively manifests in a distinct and peculiar way common human nature. This unique expression, this fulfilment of the moral function, is not, however, produced in isolation, but only through participation in the various forms of the ethical life,—the home, the school, society, the state, and the church. These are the instruments or organs which Reason has found to minister most efficiently to the higher life of man. The individual *makes his moral problem* in the *actual relationships of society*. But “without love, there is no culture.” “In virtue of his [Schleiermacher’s], fine understanding of Nature,” says Höffding, “and of the conditions of personal life he takes his place as one of the leading spirits in the Romanticist circle.”

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In addition to the works of the authors and references cited in the section, and the various histories of philosophy, see Bosanquet, *A History of Æsthetic*; Brandes, *The Romantic Movement in Germany*; Coar, *Studies in German Literature in the Nineteenth Century*; Francke, *History of German Literature*; Omond, *The Romantic Triumph*; Pfeiderer, *Development of Theology since Kant*; Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*; Watson, *Schelling's Transcendental Idealism*; Wundt, *Ethical Systems*.

Further problems for study:

1. Goethe's relation to Romanticism.
2. The *Romantic* element in the philosophy of Fichte.
3. Schelling's interpretation of nature.
4. Contributions of Romanticism to ethical theory.
5. The relation of Romanticism to the Naturalism of Rousseau.
6. Novalis.
7. Schleiermacher's conception of *individuality*.
8. The individual and social tendencies in the Romantic movement.

V

FROM KANT TO HEGEL: THE IDEALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF NATURE AND HISTORY

1. The progress of philosophy consists not so much in stages of discovery as in a gradual process of absorption of earlier problems into problems more complex and more inclusive. The wonderful vitality of the philosophic movement dominated by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel was due to three causes: (1) the legacy of the *Critical* philosophy, (2) a favorable environment, (3) the constructive insight of these three leaders. Although it seems just to maintain that the legitimate outcome of Kant's theory of knowledge is that outlined in Chapter III, sec. 5, yet Kant was never entirely able to maintain himself in this position. A dualistic and mechanical view of knowledge still haunts his system: indeed, in several places, notably in his *Refutation of Idealism*, inserted in the second edition of the *Critique*, he advances arguments amounting to a flat denial of Idealism, in making which he strangely enough gives up his own position, namely, the organic relation of subject and object. To overthrow the assumption of the independent existence of subject and object, of mind and nature, constitutes the peculiar problem of Fichte and Hegel from the epistemological point of view. No one, of course, will deny that sensations are due to the action of objects on the organism. Fichte and Hegel maintain that on Kant's own showing these *objects* are themselves determined by intelligence. Neither as object of knowledge, nor as existence, therefore, are subject and object unrelated to each other: the subject has no nature of its own independently

of the object, nor the object independently of the subject. The assumption of the independent existence of subject and object is very natural for the reason that, when we begin to explain knowledge, we already have knowledge. But in accounting for the origin of knowledge we have no right to start from the independent existence of subject and object unless it can be shown that such independent existence of subject and object can be known. When Kant asks, therefore, "By what means should our activity of knowledge be aroused into activity but by objects?" he neglects the significance of his own position, namely, that neither object nor subject exists for knowledge *prior to knowledge*, and that to ask how the subject should be aroused to activity by the object is to ask how a non-existent object should act upon a non-existent subject. In seeking for an answer to the question, What is contributed by the subject and, What comes from the object? the previous question must be answered, Is any such separation of subject and object permissible? If there is no known subject which does not imply a known object, if, in other words, both subject and object are the result of a unitary process of experience, it follows that the element belonging to the one cannot be separated from the element belonging to the other.

Here, then, we find the essential contribution of the post-Kantian epistemology. Kant, though apparently starting from the opposition of subject and object, pointed the way to the overthrow of this position. He, however, could never wholly get away from the position that while the *known* object does not exist apart from the subject, the *real* object does so exist. Fichte and Hegel, on the contrary, would remove the inconsistency by insisting upon the logical implication of the position that for knowledge the object is not an independent existence but *one in and for a conscious subject*. If for knowledge the self and the world, spirit and nature, exist for each other, then *as existences* they are not independent of each other. For, since spatial and temporal relations, and the categories which determine objectivity have a meaning only within knowledge or experience, it follows that they can no more belong to the subject than to the object, but only to the subject in so far as there has arisen for it the consciousness of an object determinable

under these relations. The object has no existence for the subject except as the subject distinguishes it from and yet relates it to itself. Whatever the object is, it is for a subject, and *any other object is a fiction of abstraction*. If this be granted, it follows that there can be no opposition between the *matter* and the *form* of knowledge: no opposition, *i. e.*, between a *matter* which comes from the object, and a *form* contributed by the subject. This is, in brief, the contention of Fichte and Hegel in their attempt to remove the contradiction in the epistemology of Kant. In other words, for them, the science of knowing and the science of being are organically one and inseparable.

2. The investigation of Kant resulted in the discovery of the self, or ego, as the supreme condition of our intellectual and moral experience. Starting from this principle of unity Fichte (1762-1814), followed by Schelling, made it, as absolute, their metaphysical principle. For Fichte, as for Hegel, philosophy means the systematic development of thought from its most abstract phase to the wealth and fulness of real existence. His task, as he conceived it, was to bring into organic connection the *dissecta membra* of the Kantian system. The connection between mind and nature, suggested by Kant, pointed to a *common root of both, an organic unity with many antitheses*: that the objective universe of nature and history, in that it is intelligible, is the working of an immanent Reason to which man's consciousness is akin. Fichte's problem was ever the determination of the relation between reason as practical and reason as cognitive. This idealism, begun by Kant and Fichte, and carried to its fuller completion by Schelling and Hegel, was destined to raise the modern mind to a higher consciousness, blending as it did "the realism of the ancient world and the inwardness and ideality of the Christian religion."

3. A brief outline summary of the more important features in Fichte's teaching may be given as follows:

(a) *Theory of knowledge*: (1) The task of philosophy is the explanation of experience. Within experience we find 'ideas of things.' With *dogmatism* we may deduce the idea from the thing, or, with *idealism*, the thing from the idea. The individual's world-conception (for the acceptance of either method involves

such a conception) thus depends on what kind of man he is. (2) By the 'thing-in-itself' Kant meant to assert nothing more than the unity and absolute objectivity which the mind gives in perception to its own creations. In experience object and subject imply each other. The term *object* does not, indeed cannot, take us beyond the limits of the mind. (3) A science of knowledge (the *science of sciences*) must be based upon one single fundamental principle, one which cannot be proved; otherwise it would be worthless as the starting-point of a system. The only absolute proof of such a principle or hypothesis is to be found in what it will do for us, and "*everything depends upon the attempt.*" Our first inquiry, then, is for the unconditioned fundamental principle which is to express that *deed-act*—the activity not occurring among the empirical determinations of our consciousness (since it is impossible so to occur), for the reason that it is the basis of all consciousness and first and alone makes consciousness possible. (4) In interrogating consciousness we find an *ego*, and a *non-ego*; but the latter is *found only in virtue of the spiritual activity of the ego or self*. Our first principle is, therefore, "the ego posits itself," and the second, "the ego posits a non-ego." Through the method of antithetical connection a third principle emerges "the ego posits a *limited ego* in opposition to a *limited non-ego*." It is not of course to be supposed that Fichte held that *the special content of experience might be deduced from general principles*. If we forget this "in our endeavor to explain the whole of life, we shall lose life itself" (see, *On the Nature of a Scholar*). For Fichte, then, the fundamental principle of a theory of knowledge is "there is nothing in the ego which is not the product of the ego's own activity"; everything in consciousness is due to a unitary, spiritual activity, a conception based on the essential inwardness and validity of the spiritual life. Ultimately all reality must be referred to self-consciousness. Man's innermost essence is in willing and working. All our presentations are conditioned by our will. Being is life, inner, active life. (5) To the question, "Why does the ego posit a non-ego within itself?" no answer can be given from the theoretical point of view. Apart from the demands of our moral consciousness it remains inexplicable. In the moral consciousness alone is the true

significance of self-activity, the world of nature and of humanity disclosed.

(b) *Theory of Ethics*: (1) As in the sphere of cognition, so in that of practice, the conception of the original activity of the self is fundamental. The moral consciousness reveals effort, struggle, aspiration towards ideal ends, as the supreme good. Activity, struggle, aspiration presuppose limitation, resistance. There would be no moral life without a system of limits, of objects to encounter, of resistances to overcome. No activity, no world: no world to overcome, no self-realization! Nature is the material of duty. (2) Activity at first directed through instinct upon objects becomes for a time dependent upon them. The activity, being infinite and therefore unsatisfied with finite objects, quickens reflection and reflection liberates the activity. Thus is freedom possible. Natural wants may thus become instrumental to the attainment of freedom. Thus in the ethical law, "Every particular action should form part of a series which leads the individual to complete spiritual freedom," are reason and sense adjusted. (3) In that the essential fact in morality consists in the submission of the will to the moral law, Fichte thinks of being as the moral nature forced to build itself a *natural order* in which it may yield obedience to the moral law, and to become self-separative in a *community of ethical individualities, through whom the moral virtues may be realized*. Thus the existence of other egos and of a world in which these egos may act is "the necessary condition of a consciousness of freedom." The outer world, then, the not-self, is just as large as the individual's spiritual activity makes it.

(c) The Absolute for Fichte is the moral consciousness universalized and conceived as absolute moral activity from which originate nature and society. Fichte's significance consists in the recognition of rational self-activity as the basis of a conception of the world, of the validity and supremacy of the inner, spiritual life. Where he fails is in his neglect to attempt an explanation of the relation between his 'schema' of spiritual evolution and the historical and the actual evolution of nature and humanity. For his neglect of the riches of intelligence as disclosed in the development of nature and history, Fichte's thought has been accused of being purely subjective idealism—

a charge not wholly without foundation. Support from experience to the essential principle of his idealism was to be brought from nature by Schelling, from history by Hegel. (See also, Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 152-153.)

4. Though strongly influenced by the Fichtean idealism, Schelling's permanent tendency was to give to the method of Fichte a more objective application and to unite with it the more realistic view of existence gained from his study of Spinoza. With the Romanticists generally, Schelling felt that Fichte had endangered the reality of the world of nature by conceiving it as merely an abstract limit to the infinite striving of spirit. Nature rather is a unity, a manifold for ordinary perception, but for reason not merely stuff for thought but a unity, the manifestation of one formative energy, the radiance of a divine manifestation. It is a realization of spirit: its outward forms are not imposed from without, but the outcome of an inner teleology. It is self-forming, the outcome of the same spirit, though unconscious, of which we are aware in self-consciousness. Nature and spirit are complementary parts of a unitary process. Schelling, accordingly, attempted to supplement Fichte by exhibiting nature as an intelligible system, as a function or process of intelligence towards self-consciousness as its necessary goal, *i.e.*, to show its essential oneness with the ego as intelligent, and not, as Descartes had done, as the "dead antithesis of conscious thought." Having as the animating principle of his thought (for him the inner type, indeed, of all things) the notion of the *reconciliation of opposites or differences*, in his attempt to adjust the changes of nature with the conception of unity in productive force, Schelling reaches the notion of duality, or polar opposition through which nature manifests itself in a dynamical series of changes—matter, light, and organism. And just as in nature through these processes the spirit struggles to consciousness (compare the theory of Leibnitz), so in the world of mind are disclosed the stages through which self-consciousness with its inevitable antagonisms and reconciliations struggles towards ideal forms. Nature is no alien power: *the object is intelligible because it is of like essence with the subject*. Nature is spirit manifest. Schelling's inquiry, therefore, is directed towards a comprehension of the unity of the world under the *one principle*

of organic development. One further point should be mentioned. Schelling had come to see that nature and personality are not two things, but are correlatives rather. In the *Identity Philosophy*, however, in his explication of this position, he returned to the position of Spinoza, in which subject and object, mind and nature, are regarded as parallel developments of equal importance and value. All difference is merged in absolute oneness. He finds nothing in spirit but what he had found in nature. In this admission, it would appear that Schelling eliminated the real import of the idealistic principle as fundamental to the thought of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. (See further brief notes on this point in *Hegel's Doctrine of the Will*, pp. 26-27, 30-31, 34-41.)

5. The problem of Hegel (1770-1831) is still the problem of Kant and Fichte, namely, What does experience involve, and what is the intimate nature of the consciousness which that experience presupposes? All three were in essential agreement in maintaining that the fundamental error of the older philosophy had been the doctrine of the independent existence of the world without and the world within, and that only in the recognition of their organic unity can any explanation of their relations one to the other be offered. The true nature of this principle of organic unity is disclosed in self-consciousness. The implications of this position had been only imperfectly grasped by Kant and Fichte. Schelling, though beginning well, had ended with Spinozism. Hegel, too, recognized that self-consciousness is the unity to which every manifold must be referred. But he was the first to show in systematic form, through an exhibition of the categories as antithetical yet 'interlocked moments' in the very nature of the self, that self-consciousness is founded upon difference; that consciousness is a 'many-in-one,'—an organic whole in which the opposition between the self and the external world is overcome. (For a more adequate statement than could justly be given in a brief outline of Hegel's interpretation of nature and history, especially the latter, on the basis of this theory of self-consciousness, see any one of the following works: Caird, *Hegel*; Harris, *The Logic of Hegel*; Wallace, art. *Hegel* in *Encyclopædia Britannica*. For an account of Hegel's theory of ethics and of the ethical development from

Kant to Hegel, see *Hegel's Doctrine of the Will*.) In the study of the ethical significance of Hegel's work the following points at least should be noted: (1) The three aspects or stages of every truth or reality, thesis, antithesis, synthesis. (2) Consciousness as an indissoluble unity of opposites. (3) The Absolute as spiritual. (4) The world of nature and humanity a process of development, a manifestation of the Absolute. (5) The notion of moral progress by antagonism. The consciousness of self implies a consciousness of not-self, and grows with it and by means of it. Its progress is thus one of self-determination and self-realization through environment—the environment of an intellectual and moral world.

In his *Logic of Hegel* Dr. Harris says that the test of any system of philosophy is the account it gives of the institutions of civilization. "What does it see in human history and the institutions of the family, civil society, the state, the church?" It is in Hegel's attempt to answer this question, to trace in the manifold forms of institutional life the element of rationality and of spiritual significance, and to indicate how the culture and perfecting of the individual life is not attained by the one whose life is lived in accordance with *mere* nature, nor by him who "cares but to pass into the silent life," but by the one who sees treasured up in the various relations of concrete social life,—the family, the community, the state, the church,—the spiritual experience of the human race, and who, supported by this insight, is living a shared life along the beaten highways of this common world. Not elsewhere, according to Hegel, is the way which leads to the everlasting life.

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Besides the works of Fichte and Hegel (especially Fichte's *Science of Rights*, and Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* and *Philosophy of History*) and the various histories of philosophy, the following interpretations may be consulted on particular points: Adamson, *Fichte*, also, *Lectures on Modern Philosophy*; Baillie, *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*; Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*; Caird (E.), *Hegel*; Caird (J.), *The Philosophy of Religion*; Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge*; Harris, *Logic of Hegel*; Hibben, *The Logic of Hegel*; Jodl, *Geschichte der Ethik in der neuen Philosophie*; McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, also, *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology*; Seth, *From Kant to Hegel*, also, *Hegelianism and Personality*; Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*; Wallace, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, *Prolegomena to the Logic of Hegel*, also *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind* (*Introductory Essays*).

Further problems for study:

1. Fichte's conception of individuality.
2. The significance for educational theory of Fichte's doctrine of self-activity.
3. Fichte's conception of institutions.
4. The development of the conception of the 'antithetical method' in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.
5. Hegel's doctrine of freedom.
6. Hegel's conception of the state.
7. Hegel's conception of the parallelism between the development of the individual and the evolution of the race.

VI

FROM ROUSSEAU TO FROEBEL; THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATIONAL IDEAS

✓ 1. In a study of the evolution of educational ideas from Rousseau to Froebel it is necessary to keep in mind the intimate but complex intellectual relations of the three great movements of the period, outlined, with a view to their educational significance chiefly, in the preceding sections, namely, (1) the *revolutionary naturalism* of Rousseau, (2) *romanticism*, (3) the *transcendental development* in philosophy from Kant to Hegel. All three movements center ultimately about the question, *What is the right life of the soul?* Without any attempt at completeness of statement and without being oblivious of their evident shortcomings, the more important elements of the ethical and cultural significance in these three movements may be noted:

✓ (a) Naturalism: (1) In asserting the innate goodness of human nature, the natural impulse of man towards perfection, the ideal simplicity of nature against the existing conventionalisms, forced the recognition of the essential *humanity of the individual* as opposed to the artificial products of culture and society. (2) In opposing nature to man, it awakened a passionate love of natural scenery, and an interest in the liberty and spontaneity of childhood. (3) In maintaining that the natural man is perverted by civilization it served to emphasize the truth that man grows by development, not by aggregation.

(b) Romanticism: (1) It helped to disclose certain of the

deepest things in nature and human life by its emphasis upon the validity of feeling and intuition in the human soul. (2) By its discontent with the actual world and its attempt through art and literature to depict a truer and worthier one, it served to give an intensity and elevation to thought in the presentation of more spiritual ideals of life. (3) It tended to look upon literature, art, philosophy, the life of nature and the past from a purely religious standpoint, not merely deepening these, but *widening the religious consciousness* as well. (4) Through its very tendency to iconoclasm Romanticism gave rise to the demand and search for fact. (5) It asserted that the true spiritual life is not constrained and forbidding, but spontaneous, free, and beautiful. (6) Above all, perhaps, it stood for *man as man as its central interest*, since for it "above all nations is humanity."

(c) Idealism: (1) Becoming penetrated with *organic* ideas, served to set the errors and extravagances of Naturalism and Romanticism in clear relief, while asserting the independence, the validity, and true inwardness of spiritual life in a manner not possible to them. (2) While asserting the supremacy of the inner over the outer, Idealism maintained that only by the light of the inner can the world without be viewed and interpreted. (3) In the fact of consciousness, which *must build its own world of experience*, and in the moral law which is at once *autonomous* and *imperative*, Idealism disclosed the basis of an individualism and a type of society which while real is but "in the making," and therefore that (4) life is *not a fixed condition*, but a *movement*, through struggle and failure, towards further *individualization* and yet more intimate forms of *social unity*. (5) Idealism, starting with the fact of self-consciousness in man—since it is self-consciousness that makes him man—and attempting to discover the interrelations of the individual mind and of human institutions, showed that not in isolation, but only in an environment of social institutions is the individual to find fulfilment for his will and assert his freedom, since the institutional life of man is the objective expression of his freedom, of the moral ideal thus far realized. (6) Idealism asserted the connection of nature and history by means of the concept of development. It showed, moreover, not merely that man realizes himself only as he comes into relation with social

institutions, but that he comes to know himself only as he comes to know the objective world of nature as well. For idealism, nature is neither indifferent nor extraneous to the life of man. The opposition is but apparent, for in man nature is at once completed and transcended. From nature man's life begins: through nature he becomes self-conscious: the stimulus of nature is the condition of man's self-assertion: in mastery of nature is his self-realization. But for Idealism nature is intelligible and man intelligent because they are not completely isolable entities, but, with humanity, are *members of a greater whole*, an absolute, spiritual life, of whom and to whom are all things. (For the significance of Idealism as an interpretation of *the method of the personal life*, see the writings of Caird (E.) and Wallace. A fine, though brief, statement is to be found in John Caird's *Philosophy of Religion*, Chap. IX. The above characteristics are somewhat more fully developed in the monograph, *Hegel's Doctrine of the Will*.)

2. In turning to the consideration of Rousseau's educational theory the most important point to be noted is that as a theory it is altogether the logical implication of his general social philosophy. In both the fundamental idea is that of the natural goodness of human nature. Man comes into the world with no innate depravity. It is an evil education in degenerate, social institutions that corrupts him. Eliminate all such evil influences, and the very force of his inherent nature, in itself good, will assert itself and *impel him towards its perfection*. The *Émile* is but one phase of the larger social theory. Its central idea seems to be this,—the corruption of human life and human society is due to the artificial restraint imposed on the individual by intellectual culture and social organization. The educational theory, therefore, starts from the assumption that, if these restraints imposed by society and civilization are broken, and the original nature of man be given free play, a life of natural innocence and perfection will result.

(a) As in his treatises upon the inequality of man he traces the progress of the race from the natural to the civilized, so in the *Émile* Rousseau proposed an entirely similar problem. *Émile* is humanity personified, in the natural condition of childhood: a tutor teaches this child of nature naturally. } Edu-

cation must through isolation free the individual from the contaminating influence of human intercourse. Later *Émile* is to enter the 'civilized' condition, the human relations of the present world. The main argument of the *Émile* may be outlined as follows: (1) The individual is naturally good. (2) Since the individual is debased by society the only hope of reform lies in an education *according to nature*. (3) The aim of such an education should be to make the individual independent and self-sufficient; in a sense, a republic in himself. (4) Education should be natural as a free expression of the individual's instinctive and impulsive life,—"*Nature's course of development*." (5) The rational and moral nature of the child should be trained for the most part through the recognition and discipline of consequences. (6) Up to the twelfth year the education should be negative; the attempt not to gain time but to lose it, should be made. Let the body and the senses be developed but the mind lie fallow. (7) No religious prejudices should be permitted, no books read, save *Robinson Crusoe* and the book of Nature.

(b) A lack of uniformity in Rousseau's usage of 'Nature' should be noted. It is used to designate (1) an element in his general naturalistic philosophy, that man is naturally good, but becomes depraved by society. The fall of man is his fall into institutions. (2) As designating a state of liberty and equality, for which education should prepare. (3) In the sense of education according to the method or principles of human nature. (4) In the sense of education through contact with the things of nature, without the interference of man. In this case nature is used in the sense of inanimate or subhuman nature. Education in this sense means education through contact with physical nature.

(c) The appreciation and criticism of Rousseau's educational ideas naturally center about (1) the conception of education as the fundamental form of social reconstruction; (2) the conception of the state of nature; (3) the conception of the relation of the individual to society; (4) the confusion of natural spontaneity with spiritual freedom; (5) the conception of negative education; (6) the conception of education through isolation *versus* education through participation; (7) the idea

of the individuality of the child as point of departure in education; (8) the conception of the ethical personality of the child as motive in education; (9) his appreciation of the significance of the study of the child; (10) the conception of development rather than instruction; (11) his influence upon Herder, Goethe, Basedow, Kant, Pestalozzi, and indirectly upon Froebel.

3. Basedow (1723-1790) and his educational ideas—Relation to Rousseau—Basedow and Goethe—Goethe's preference for the *Orbis Pictus* to the *Elementary*—the *Book of Method* for parents and teachers—Education according to nature—Basedow on individuality—Realism.

4. (a) In an appreciation of the ethical and educational significance of the work of Kant, the following points should be noted: (1) The significance for philosophy of *the general inquiry into the conditions of experience*. (2) The significance of Kant's critical method in the determination of the philosophical bases of education conceived as *the process through which the individual gains control of his experience*. (3) His critical and educational interest. (4) The idea of organism as uniting the individual with nature, society, and the race. (5) Synthesis (*not necessarily appearing as object of consciousness*) as the fundamental form of the activity of consciousness. (6) The doctrine of the self-activity of pure reason. (7) The attempt to discover *the intimate structure of knowledge and the adaptation of objective nature to the human mind—of the intelligible world to intelligence*. (8) The unity of the theoretical and practical reason. (9) His doctrine of personality. (10) Morality as the aim of life, and duty as regulative in the educational process. "A pedagogy of the Will." (11) The actual content of his *Lectures on Education*. (12) The cultural and the moral aims. (13) Reason and Faith in the personal life. (14) The significance of Kant's moral idealism in subsequent thought.

[For a good statement of the place of Kant's thought in the history of education, see the introduction in Dr. Buchner's edition of the *Lectures on Pedagogy*. (*Kant's Educational Theory*.)]

(b) It is necessary to indicate briefly the significance of the Kantian epistemology for educational methodology. Fundamentally *the problem of subject-matter and method* in education is one with the question of epistemology in philosophy; that

is, the problem of the relation of subject and object, of reason and experience, of intelligence or mind to the world. The Cartesian dualism is the epistemology which underlies the ordinary views of the relation of subject-matter and method. According to Descartes, the mind and the world, consciousness and matter are absolute disparates. The mind on the one hand is an entity by itself, with its own peculiar nature, its formal faculties, and peculiar modes of operation. It can be studied in and by itself, quite apart from its surroundings, apart from its relations to the environment, as we would say in the terminology of the present. The world or nature, on the other hand, was the absolute opposite of mind, a purely material thing, at best a mere object for intelligence or spirit, but in itself, or in its own structure not conceived as *embodying* or *reflecting* intelligence or spirit. Against this dualism a reaction set in and in two directions—Empiricism and Rationalism. Empiricism, minimizing the work of mind, attempted to show how the mental world is but part of a material world and *is gradually built up through the agency of this wider material world*. This is practically the position of Hobbes, Locke, and, from one point of view, of Herbart. On the other hand, Rationalism, especially Leibnitz, proceeded to show how *the material world is a gradual evolution in consciousness*. Every monad, or individual soul, contains the world implicitly. Kant's significance consisted in his attempt to mediate between these two extreme positions: his attempt, in other words, to show that, if the mind's life is in any sense a process, evolution is as necessary as involution, and involution as essential as evolution.

The counterpart of philosophical dualism in educational theory and practice, as was said above, is the dualism which in large measure obtains in the conception of the relations between subject-matter and method at the present time. They are treated as though they were quite as separable as the mind and matter of philosophic dualism. On the one hand, the subject-matter is classified and arranged as a pre-existing, objective, material, ready to be imported into the mind. Method on the other hand is regarded as a purely formal affair, an altogether psychological matter, as though the mind were self-subsisting apart from its relations, or its environment, and had certain

powers, or modes of functioning in and for itself after the manner of philosophic dualism. There is thus an intrinsic separation between mind and subject-matter. Methods, of necessity, became mechanical for the simple reason that they became little more than statements of devices by which the hard and fast dualism between the isolated mind on the one hand with its ways of working, and a separated, isolated subject-matter on the other, might for the brief space of the school period be overcome. If, however, it be maintained that from the epistemological point of view the so-called 'subject' (mind) and the so-called 'object' (the world) are equally the differentiated aspects or results of a unitary process, we are inevitably forced to the conclusion that subject-matter and method are not isolable entities, but are fundamentally the terminal or differentiated aspects of the process of development of a unitary experience. Subject-matter, accordingly, is relative to the nature of the individual. It is not something hard and fixed, external to the mind. The educational process is not the outcome of a mind with pre-formed faculties *exercising upon external material*, nor is it the adaptation of a mind to a material completely pre-determined. It is a process in which the organization of the material goes hand in hand with the organization or realization of a self or person. (See also, *Syllabus of a Course on the Philosophy of Education*, pp. 20-24, 41-43, 58-59. On the general significance of Kant's *theory of knowledge*, see Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*. Other factors coöperated with the Kantian epistemology to make the position of philosophic dualism seem untenable, factors which can be merely enumerated: (1) The development of the Nature-philosophy of Schelling and Hegel. (2) The growth of industry and an appreciation of its dependence upon science and nature. (3) The growth of the nature-sense. (4) The abandonment of the faculty psychology and the adoption of a psychology of a more social, voluntaristic, and pragmatic type. (5) The adoption of an evolutionary or dynamic view of reality and experience.)

5. In the work of Fichte, considered from the educational point of view, the following points should be noted: (1) The influence of Kant and Pestalozzi. (2) The ethical significance of the unitary, free, self-activity of reason, theoretical and

practical. (3) Reason in its practical aspect (*i.e.*, as *will*) fundamental. (4) The world intelligible only from the standpoint of spirit, as spirit only from the standpoint of will. (5) The world as the product of mind, as the material of duty manifest to sense, and the voice of duty as the highest manifestation of the divine. (6) The dependence of the ethical life upon a *system of limits*. (7) Action in accordance with one's own conviction of duty. (8) The somewhat negative conception of institutions coupled with the ideal of individual passion and service for the common life. The thought of Fichte is in life, action, service. His desire was ever not so much to inform, as to summon, to constrain his hearers to the formation of a deeper, more vital conception of *what life means, what it ought to be*. What it means, what it ought to be in the light of its meaning, is revealed not merely to reflection: rather is its reality disclosed to the *noble will*. (A comparison between Fichte's interpretation of life as the material of right and duty, with Schiller's interpretation as found in *The Artist, Grace and Dignity*, and *Letters upon the Æsthetic Education of Man*, would form an interesting study.)

6. For Goethe "man is most interesting to man and should perhaps be his only interest. All else that surrounds us is *either the means of life or the instruments which we use*." Goethe's one interest, his one problem, is that of human culture, the spiritual, educational possibilities of the human life of man in all its concrete intensity, richness, and variety. His writings are in a unique sense a fulfilment of Faust's aspiration to take upon himself the burden of our common humanity—"ihr Wohl und Weh auf meinen Busen häufen, und so mein eigen Selbst zu ihrem Selbst erweitern." The great works, *Faust, Wilhelm Meister, The Elective Affinities*, are educational treatises in the widest sense, and are apprehended or truly discerned only when studied from the point of view of their spiritual significance,—or, as Spinoza might say, as treatises *De Emendatione Intellectus*. The work of Kant is an inquiry into the nature, the presuppositions, the limits, of human experience. The work of Hegel is a study of the great forms of institutional life in which experience has been organized in the historic evolution of the human spirit. The work of Goethe is an interpretation of the

many-sidedness, the universality of human experience,—an attempt to “grasp the exhaustless life that all men live.”

In a study of Goethe's legacy of thought some of the more fructifying ideas may be enumerated as follows: (1) The conception of life as fundamentally and essentially *personal, positive, and significant*. (2) “Everything that man undertakes to produce, whether by action, word, or in whatsoever way, ought to spring from the union of all his faculties.” (3) The consequent failure of mere knowledge to satisfy the deepest needs of the soul. (4) Life as involving an element of experiment, but the failure of mere experience as such to satisfy the soul. (5) The fatalism of lawless passion originating in the conflict between elemental instinct and the moral law. (6) The conception of development through activity, opposition, struggle, aspiration. Life is essentially progressive. For Goethe the true merit of a life as of a work of art lies not so much in its regularity as in its power of expression. In man is the capacity of ever larger and larger life. (7) The idea of each individual mind as having within it a tendency to complete manifestation of itself. (8) The necessity of discovering the relation between capacity and activity. Self-development implies self-restriction. (9) The educational end within the life-aim or process. (10) The development of freedom through the appropriation of the principle embodied in the ideals imitated. (11) Self-forgetfulness as the result of fullest self-development and self-expansion. (12) Individual isolation, selfishness, agnosticism are self-destructive: reconciliation with reality is won by actual experience and faithful work in the loving service of man. (13) *The community of all life*, the possibility of expiation and of moral recovery. (14) The purity and piety of the heart the road to spiritual insight. (15) ‘The three Reverences’ as a programme of education. (16) *Das Ewig-weibliche zieht uns hinan*. (17) The divine immanence in all nature and human life.

In Goethe's theory of education (stated in briefest form) two distinct tendencies are apparent (1) concerning the individual as such, (2) concerning the individual as a member of society. His problem is how to secure adjustment to the collective life of humanity without interfering with the fullest perfection of the personality of the individual. As an indi-

vidual, man should unfold his innate capacities through aspiration, effort, struggle, and even failure, that he may attain to perfect culture, to the inner harmony of his own personal life. As a member of society he should take up into himself that education, common and universal, which embraces the type forms of human experience. Through self-expression and self-realization the individual should become an active organ of humanity, a conscious bearer of the social purpose. True education proceeds, therefore, through the fullest development of individual capacity and spontaneity in accordance with the general law embodied in nature and human institutions. Its task is to facilitate and to regulate the process of individual participation in the collective life of humanity.)

7. Richter (1763-1825) was in many ways a typical representative of German life in the early nineteenth century. "In him," says Francke, "it seemed the ideal of an harmonious, all-embracing individuality—the main-spring of classic German literature,—had taken bodily form and come to walk among men." In the consideration of the two educational treatises, (1) *Preparatory Course of Æsthetic* (1804), and *Levana, or the Doctrine of Education* (1807), note (1) the Romantic influence, (2) Richter's conception of education as a liberation and realization of individuality—"the harmonious maximum of individual qualities taken together"; (3) as a social process; (4) his conception of the importance of early education, of the need of freedom and joyousness in children, of the educational significance of play; (5) the relation between his theory of play and the theories of Schiller and Froebel.

8. In the work of Schleiermacher the educational influence and significance of the following factors should be considered (1) his conception of the sacredness of individual character of personality; (2) the religious basis of the moral law and of the spiritual order of society; (3) his doctrine of institutions as objective reason; (4) his reconciliation of self-development (increasing individualization) and self-surrender (increasing participation) to the common life and humanity; (5) religion as the fundamental disposition governing the development and participation of the personal life.

9. In Pestalozzi (1746-1827) is found a remarkable instance

of a life endowed with deep and far-seeing intuitions, and penetrated with an unceasing love of the people and an enthusiasm for their education and improvement. In his deeply religious nature Pestalozzi reminds us of Comenius; in the intensity of his feeling and of his demand for freedom he resembles Rousseau; while in his lofty integrity, his firm adherence to right and duty, he resembles the philosopher Kant. His life is one long record of sincere consecration to the cause of education as the only certain method of material elevation, and of moral and intellectual regeneration—a method by which a people can be helped to a more industrious, more satisfying, purer and more spiritual mode of life. Herein is Pestalozzi's supreme claim to our remembrance, namely, that to him, perhaps, more than to any other man is due the movement towards popular education which was certainly one of the distinguishing marks of the past century. With his name there is usually united on the one hand the development of the method of sense-perception or of object teaching; on the other, the development of a psychological basis of instruction; but both of these seem secondary merits when compared with his deep and passionate insight into *the social importance of the elevation of the people and the methods and suggestions which are owed to him for the realization of that end.*

(a) Certain dominant elements in his character should be noted: (1) an acute sensibility of nature, (2) an intense love of individual freedom, (3) a moral rigorism, a lofty idealism and optimism, (4) a deep humanitarianism,—an unselfish love of the poor and unfortunate among mankind.

(b) In the study of Pestalozzi's life note especially: (1) His early experiences, and the social and industrial conditions in Zürich. (2) The revival of literature and the study of philosophy, the demand for greater simplicity of life and manners, the movement towards intellectual and political freedom. (3) The influence of Pestalozzi's teachers, especially Zimmerman, Bodmer, Breitingen, the influence of Rousseau, Fichte, and Kant. (4) His various philanthropic experiments, and his experience in teaching. (5) The high, ethical purpose ever before his mind, from which he never turned aside, the moral and social elevation of the people.

(c) While all his writings have educational bearings, the following appear to be of special importance in studying the development of his doctrine and of its various elements in their mutual relations: (1) *The Evening Hour of a Hermit* (1780). This consists of a series of aphorisms—180 in all—on general educational principles and on the rise of a people through education. In it is to be found the germ of Pestalozzi's educational theory: (i) a criticism of the artificial methods of the schoolroom; (ii) the right of the individual to education; (iii) the development of the soul through inner culture; (iv) the necessity of grounding education and the moral elevation of a people in a purer and more vital religious life. (2) *Leonard and Gertrude*, Vol. I (1781), Vol. II (1783), Vol. III (1785), Vol. IV (1787). A social romance which Pestalozzi regarded as his "first word to the heart of the poor and of the abandoned of the land." Its central theme is the physical, intellectual, and spiritual elevation of a people *through work, through piety, and through education*. The important ideas developed might be briefly stated thus: (i) an education of individuals suited to their station in life; (ii) the development of the latent powers of every individual and the inculcation of a piety of the heart; (iii) the place of industries in elementary education; (iv) the social importance of education and the interrelation of home, school, church, and state in maintaining and elevating the social life. (3) *Researches into the Course of Nature in the Development of the Human Race* (1797). In many respects a remarkable work, in which he seeks to justify the great importance which he attaches to nature in the education of man. Written at the suggestion of Fichte, it amounts to a study in the evolution of man. He breaks away from the atomistic theory of Rousseau and attains to the idea of humanity as an organic unity. It is pervaded by a theory of morality, thoroughly Kantian in spirit. It suggests the subsequent attempt which has been made to base education upon the law of evolution. He distinguishes three levels in the development of man: the *animal*—the product of nature; the *social*—the product of the race or of social relationships; the *moral*—the product of man himself, consisting in the development of the higher elements of his nature implanted by the Creator in the human soul.

(Compare Fichte's doctrine of the State as having to do with the external nature of man only.) In the volume two important conclusions are reached: (i) the parallelism between the evolution of the race and the development of the individual; (ii) the desirability of founding the laws for the education of the individual on the laws of human evolution. (4) *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children* (1801). This work presents the history of Pestalozzi's methodology, as it may be called, or his views on the aims and methods of instruction. (5) *The Song of the Swan* (1826). *My Destinies as Head of the Institutes at Berthoud and Yverdon* (1826). To this should be added, *Letters on Early Education*, written to Greaves, an Englishman, between 1818 and 1820.

(d) In considering the social philosophy of Pestalozzi note: (1) The political and social character of the period. (2) The influence of Rousseau; points of resemblance and difference. (3) Pestalozzi's conception of the interdependence of human life. (4) Influence of Romanticism: the right of the individual to freer, more natural self-expression. (5) The actual content of Pestalozzi's social theory: (i) the relation of the individual to society; (ii) the three levels of human life, natural, social, moral; (iii) the *moral* as above the *social*; (iv) the individual's recapitulation of the life of the race. (6) The inter-relation of the institutions that educate—home, church, government, school. (7) Relation between Pestalozzi's social theory and his theory of education. (The somewhat scattered materials of Pestalozzi's social philosophy and psychological theory have been gathered together and systematized by Rothenberger, *Pestalozzi als Philosoph in Berner Studien zur Philosophie*.)

(e) In turning to the consideration of the more important elements in the educational theory of Pestalozzi it is first of all to be noted that (1) while Rousseau had regarded education as a means whereby individuals might be saved from the corrupting and enslaving influences of civilization, Pestalozzi ever regarded it as a fundamental means to raising human beings into an intelligent, social, and moral life. It is true that Pestalozzi was strongly influenced by Rousseau, and attempted to carry out the Rousseau plan of unsocial education with his own child. He perceived the impossibility of the plan, yet he never

completely got away from *Rousseauism*, retaining, as did Fichte, in the background of his consciousness the doctrine that human institutions were at best a somewhat mechanical or artificial appendage to the individual life. The doctrine that the institutions of society constitute that system of life in which alone the individual becomes a person was an insight of later writers in education. Pestalozzi, however, did not abandon the best element in Rousseau's teaching—the necessity of making the child and his circle of experience and activity the starting-point in instruction. (2) While Pestalozzi was never able to reach a satisfactory or logical account of the relation of the individual and society, nevertheless he saw clearly that the individual left to himself, or deprived of education, could never become truly human. It is necessary for society, in order to its own preservation, to transform the natural man into the social man. The education of the people thus becomes the highest social duty. (3) Education must be conceived fundamentally as national education. All attempts at the culture of the intelligence and the elevation of the moral nature of the individual will be unavailing, which are not the outcome of the whole spirit and life of a people and which do not return to the people as their original possession. Pestalozzi not only recognized the social importance of education, but discerned the necessity of correlating the great forces of the community life, the home, the school, the church, and the state, with a view to maintaining, elevating, and perpetuating the social life of the people. This idea of elaborating and elevating education *into a social or national system* constitutes one of Pestalozzi's great claims to remembrance. (4) As an outcome of his contact with the life of the common people Pestalozzi discerned that the fundamental source of their barren and unprogressive life was the lack of recognition on their part of the laws of nature and of life, and their consequent disorder and levity, the absence of moral and religious sentiment, the prejudice and revenges against the authorities who only too readily profited by their weaknesses. The source of their spiritual elevation he sought in education. But first of all he had to discover its sure and simple methods and materials. As a result of his inquiry Pestalozzi took as the fundamental principle of his method, that education, if it is to

fit man for his destination in life, must proceed in accordance with the laws of nature. In other words, experience and intuition led him to believe that education must not be any arbitrary intervention between the child and nature, between the individual and the laws of nature and humanity; rather must it assist the natural development of the individual, not hindering or doing violence to it; following, not forcing; developing, not moulding in accordance with an artificial or mechanical programme. (5) Pestalozzi thinks of the soul not as a mechanism but as *an organism endowed with an impulse towards its own growth and realization*. It is a unity of physical, intellectual, and spiritual powers, existing at first only in germ; and while dependent for its sustenance first of all on its sense-surroundings, yet not physically bound, but capable of raising itself above the level of sense and impulse to the plane of the intellectual and the spiritual, while still retaining the former as instruments of its purposes. Development, whether in child or man, is no mere effect of outside forces or of foreign will beyond the individual: it is rather the individual's inborn power of effort, later on flowering into free and autonomous will which stirs to feeling and to thought. With Kant, Pestalozzi regards the capacities of the soul as its immanent and constitutive essence. The common need of humanity is the growth and development of man himself. Nature has done her part: let man do his! Teaching, then, is nothing more than the *art of helping the impulse, the striving of nature after its own development*. But in true development there is harmony and proportion of parts, mutual adaptation and adjustment of elements. Education, indeed, should aim at "the harmonious and equable development of the human powers." Its work is being accomplished in raising man's nature from the sensuous plane of merely physical existence to that level of life and happiness which is possible for him through the harmonious upbuilding of body, mind, and spirit; the powers of art, of mind, of heart united by an organic bond and coöperant to a common end. And the ultimate forces in this upbuilding of man's true nature, Pestalozzi declares, are *love and faith*; forces which together unify man's powers of knowing and acting, love proceeding from faith and both in turn from God, the Father of man's life,

necessary thereto as are the roots to the tree. (6) In recognizing the organic nature of the mental life Pestalozzi was led to emphasize the continuous character of mental development, and to make "continuity" a fundamental element in his method. For him the mental life was essentially a process of development or unfolding and only incidentally one of acquisition and possession. Whilst seeking, therefore, to exercise and strengthen the capacities of the child by means of incitements to activity he endeavored to discover points of contact within the child's experience, to proceed in uninterrupted course from one point to another, taking care that the first should be fixed in the mind before proceeding to the second.

(f) The more important elements of permanent significance in the work of Pestalozzi may be noted in outline: (1) The conception of education as a fundamental source of social elevation. (2) The conception of education as essentially national education. (3) In a very real sense Pestalozzi became the creator of the modern elementary schools in that, while conceiving the educational aim to be "the development and education of humanity from its own center," he did not confine such development of the inner powers and capacities of human nature to particular classes of society, but maintained that the poorest and lowliest should participate in its benefits. Pestalozzi recognized the rational organization of elementary education as a matter of primary importance. (4) His recognition of the central and fundamental influence of the home life, and the necessity of correlation and coöperation of the various educational factors of the community in the education of the individual. In connection with the recognition of the significance of the home life in education is Pestalozzi's demand that a systematic development of the child's earliest consciousness should precede all real instruction. The mother is the child's first and best teacher. (5) His demand that instruction be based on the immediate experience of the individual; that sense-perception be made the basis of all intellectual instruction; that in the method of instruction all arbitrariness be eliminated, and a natural mode of procedure based on the principle of inner activity substituted in place of an artificial mechanical one—in a word, there should be naturalness of method in teaching and

learning. (6) His attempt in the government of children to introduce the method based on interesting and developing activity, on thoughtful guidance, on a loving treatment of the pupil—since love is the essential form of all human learning—in place of one based on mere compulsion or merely mechanical discipline. (7) Pestalozzi restored to credit the processes of the method of sense-perception. For him, in elementary education sense-perception is the fundamental principle of instruction, indeed, the absolute foundation of knowledge. Considered by itself it is nothing else than the mere presence of external objects to sense, and the *mere stirring of the consciousness of their impression*. In other words, Pestalozzi would make the sense-experience of the child the educational starting-point. Clear perception is the basis of clear thinking. The world lies before the child at first merely as a mass of confused impressions. In large measure it is the task of elementary instruction to bring definiteness out of chaos, to separate objects from one another, grouping the like, in order that clear conceptions may be formed. Out of the confused impressions, definite and clear perceptions may emerge, and on the basis of clear perceptions distinct ideas may gradually be built up. The development of the faculty of thought thus has its starting-point in grouping, separating, and comparing the objects of sense-perception. (8) It was ever Pestalozzi's aim to discover a method of instruction by which the individual might attain an intelligent contact with the real world. This, he thought, must be brought about through a simplification of instruction. *What, then, are the great rubrics of instruction?* What are the connecting links between the mind of the individual and the real world by which he is encompassed? "I long sought," he writes, "for a common psychological origin for all these arts of instruction, because I was convinced that only through this might it be possible to discover the form in which the cultivation of mankind is determined through the very laws of nature itself. It is evident this form is founded on the general organization of the mind, by means of which our understanding binds together in imagination the impressions which are received by the senses from nature into a whole, that is, into an idea, and gradually unfolds this idea clearly. . . . At last, suddenly, like a *Deus*

ex machina, came the thought—the means of making clear all knowledge gained by sense-impression comes from *number, form, and language*." These are, together, "the elementary means of instruction, because the whole sum of the external properties of any object is comprised in *its outline* and *its number*, and is brought home to consciousness through *language*." Number, form, and language, as typical materials, form the elementary means of instruction. These, therefore, number, form, and language, are made by Pestalozzi the fundamental subjects of elementary instruction, in that they are the essential conditions of distinct and definite knowledge. These should be taught with the utmost possible simplicity, comprehensiveness, mutual connection, and continuity. It is needless to say that the value of Pestalozzi's attempt to establish an alphabet of sense-perception lies in the originality of the endeavor rather than in positive achievement. (Compare this attempt of Pestalozzi to attain an alphabet of sense-perception with the theory underlying the *Gifts* of Froebel, and the *A B C of Sense-Perception* of Herbart.)

REFERENCES:

In addition to the works of the authors named in the text, the various histories and encyclopædias (German) of education and the separate monographs of Buchner (*Kant*), Davidson (*Rousseau*), Luqueer (*Hegel*), Pinloche (*Pestalozzi*), see the works of Adamson, Bonar, Bosanquet, Caird, Erdmann, Falckenberg, Francke, Höffding, Jodl, Paulsen, Pfeiderer, Robertson, Royce, Scherer, Seth, Thomas (Introduction to his edition of Goethe's *Faust*), Wallace, Windelband, Wundt, to which reference has been made in preceding chapters: also, Schleiermacher, *Die Gute Lebens Art; On Religion* (Oman); Fichte, *Popular Works: The Nature of the Scholar. The Vocation of Man, The Doctrine of Religion* (Smith); Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (Dyde).

Further problems for study:

1. The individual and his relation to society as reflected in the work of (1) Kant, (2) Fichte, (3) Goethe, (4) Pestalozzi, (5) Schleiermacher, (6) Hegel.
2. The background of (1) political theory, (2) economic theory, (3) religious doctrine during this period.
3. Education as *world-building*.
4. The significance for a philosophy of education of Kant's problem concerning the *possibility of experience*.

5. The significance of Epistemology for educational methodology.
6. Education and *teleology*.
7. The condition of German Schools from 1750-1800.
8. Motives underlying the Elementary School.
9. The historical conception of industrial education.
10. The concept of civilization.
11. "Rousseau took no step forward in education."—Davidson.
12. Pestalozzi's educational experiments.

VII

REALISM IN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION: HERBART

1 (a) Among the philosophic opponents of the Idealistic philosophy developed by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the more important are Beneke, Herbart, and Schopenhauer. The opposition of Beneke was directed chiefly against the method of the Idealists. Herbart, starting with experience, ranged himself against the ontological position of Idealism, denying that it is possible to deduce everything from a single principle, and opposing its monism with a pluralistic metaphysics, and its philosophy of becoming with a philosophy of being. Reality is an indefinite multitude of irreducibly different entities. Schopenhauer, in turn, opposed the Idealistic estimate of the worth of life, denying rationality both to the world and to the world-ground. All considered themselves true disciples of Kant. From the point of view of exact scientific method Herbart is undoubtedly the most important name among the opponents of Idealism. He claimed that his system was more in harmony with the spirit of Kant than were the systems of the Idealists. He used to describe himself as a "Kantian of the year of 1828." However this may be, it is not a difficult matter to recognize that, even though Herbart appropriated a determinable element of the Kantian system, nevertheless he introduced in it a foreign element through the influence of which the Kantian element was modified in several fundamental respects.

(b) Herbart (1776-1841) before entering the University of Jena in 1794 had already gained some acquaintance with the systems of Wolff and Kant. In the university he came to

know Schiller and Fichte. Two years after entering he handed to Fichte, his teacher in philosophy and the follower of Kant, a critique of two of Schelling's treatises, in which it was clearly shown that he had already broken with Idealism. His first meeting with Pestalozzi was in 1797. At first connected with Göttingen, Herbart became professor in Königsberg in 1809, where in 1810 he established and conducted a seminary in education until 1833. From 1833 till his death in 1841 he was professor of philosophy in Göttingen.

(c) Rejecting an idealistic metaphysics with its philosophy of becoming, Herbart accepts a pluralistic metaphysics and a philosophy of being. For him, as for the Eleatics, being is absolutely simple. In his reaction against the Idealism of Hegel he adopts a position which is practically a union of the Eleatic and Atomistic points of view—of Parmenides and Democritus. *Analysis of what is given in experience* forced him to believe that we must rest content by positing many simple existences, Reals—the ultimate ground of things. Such a Real was God, such the soul, such the elements of matter. He holds that appearance is not an essential quality of being; indeed, being and appearance are quite different in essence. The true reality does not become, does not change, is neither increased nor decreased. In the manifold of Reals, each particular Real is independent of all others. We can know nothing at all of the proper nature of Reals, hence we cannot know whether they are material or spiritual. Herbart's system is in a way a mechanical monadology. To Leibnitz he owed the idea of the soul as a monad, but allowed to it simply existence, whereas Leibnitz (with Kant and Hegel) laid stress on activity, unity, synthesis. On the one hand, Herbart declares that "being is absolute position; its concept excludes all negation and all relation," and "the soul is a simple substance not only without parts, but with no plurality whatever in its quality." On the other hand, the monad or Real has the power of self-conservation though not of self-realization. This quality of the Reals is more evident in those beings to which we attribute force and life, and which rise to consciousness in our inner experience as sensations. Indeed, Herbart admits that the only example of self-conservation accessible to us is that of our own sensations.

Thus, after all, he, in his way, conceives the Reals in analogy with our own psychical states. The following difficulties are retained by Herbart in his metaphysics: (1) the dualism of appearance and reality, (2) the denial of change to the Reals. According to Herbart every continuum is excluded from reality. If he insists on the independence of the Reals, their communion remains unaccountable.

(d) Herbart's psychology is of the *association* type according to which neither the content nor the form of knowledge is furnished by the mind. The problem of the self presented itself to him first of all in connection with Fichte's Ego, which is conceived in unceasing self-activity. The soul is a Real like other Reals; its sensations and ideas are expressions of its self-preservation. It is an error to look upon it as an aggregate of all sorts of faculties. There exists neither feeling, nor knowledge, nor willing, as faculties or as innate forces or energies. There is but one source of mental life, the presentation or sensation which arises in the soul when it has to maintain itself against another soul. At first, merely blank, formal unity of which nothing can be said excepting that it can act in self-defence; the soul shows its character by what it does in the struggle for existence. Its peculiar mode of self-defence is a sensation or presentation. It admits presentations to its domain. Admission proves to be occupation. Its former assailants are, so to speak, naturalized as ideas. Henceforth the varying mental contents contend for supremacy, uninfluenced and unhindered by the soul. Presentations are thus the ultimate elements of the mental life, whose subsequent unity and complexity are to be explained through the mechanical interaction and combination of the primary elements. The development of the mental life consists in the increasing conflicts and harmonies among its constituent units: some of which blend together by means of *assimilations*; others again unite in groups by means of *complications*; while others *remain at variance* among themselves; the resulting whole constituting the ego or self.

(e) The necessity for assuming a psychical Real lies in the fact that our ideas are always *reciprocally related and interact one with the other*. It is a rather curious phenomenon that Herbart should not have developed more fully the implications of

his doctrine that there is no unconnected manifold in consciousness. There is, he maintains, a continuous tendency among the ideas to form one single activity, until by assimilation and complication there arises a total force which we designate the ego or self, a product rather than a principle, and which determines the nature of subsequent assimilations. Only that which is capable of blending with the prevailing group of ideas ('apperception') can attain to psychical existence. The apperceiving group of ideas determines the nature of the personality. Thus for Herbart the 'self' is a composite; consciousness is not the condition but rather the resultant of ideas which are primarily forces. "The Ego is a result of presentations which unite and interpenetrate one another in a single substance (the soul)." Just here there seems to be a conflict between Herbart's psychology and his metaphysics. If the unity of consciousness can be explained by the reciprocal action of the elements, the metaphysical explanation of the unity by a soul-substance is superfluous: if, on the contrary, he starts with a soul-substance he cannot look upon the unity merely as a product. First we have inactivity among the 'Reals'; then collisions or attacks, against which souls or Reals react. These 'reactions' are presentations. The intellect is simply the sum of these and their combinations conceived in their totality. Feeling arises through the partial suppression of one presentation or idea. Desire arises in the successful struggle of presentations or ideas against others which tend to suppress them. Desire issues in will when it is accompanied by the belief that the object is attainable. According to Herbart, therefore, we are to think of the mind not as an organism but as a mechanism.

(f) Herbart appears to hold that every idea is a distinct entity (originating, it is true, as has been seen, as a reaction of the soul to stimuli, and therefore representing a certain qualitative form of the soul itself). His theory is an extreme form of psychological atomism. He does not recognize, however, that if the essence of conscious life is a synthesis or combining activity, the particular elements can possess no independent energy. He returns, in a sense, to a type of faculty psychology. When once produced, the idea is an existence by itself, possessed of its own dynamic force, striving to come before consciousness;

striving, indeed, to attain the summit of consciousness. It is the same idea whether in or beneath consciousness. Various ideas, of course, help or hinder one another in attaining and retaining the field of consciousness. A presentation or idea coming into consciousness tends to draw those allied to it also into consciousness and to force out those unlike. Ideas which are similar, congruent, assist one another, and *vice versa*. It will thus be recognized that the essential point in the control of experience (*i.e.*, in education) will be to get the right grouping of like ideas, to form strong associations among the important ideas so that they will always reinforce one another. This seems to be the fundamental explanation of the Herbartian emphasis upon *correlation* and *concentration*.

2 (a) Education as a science is based, according to Herbart, on ethics and psychology. The former points out the goal of education; it sets the problem; the latter the way, the means, and the obstacles to the solution of the problem. This relationship involves the dependence of education on experience inasmuch as ethics includes application to experience, while psychology has its starting-point, not in metaphysics alone, but in experience correctly interpreted by metaphysics.

(b) The aim of education is morality or virtue: its means is *educative instruction*. "Virtue is the whole of the educational purpose." Inner freedom is the complete harmony of willing and moral insight. The "good will,"—the most important characteristic of Herbart's conception of morality (compare Kant),—"is the steady resolution of a man to consider himself as an individual under the law which is universally binding."

(c) "The ultimate purpose of instruction is contained in the notion, virtue, morality. But in order to realize the final aim, another and nearer one must be set up. We may term it many-sidedness of interest. The word 'interest' stands in general for that kind of mental activity which it is the business of instruction to incite. Mere information does not suffice; for this we think of as a supply or store of facts, which a person might possess or lack, and still remain the same being. But he who lays hold of his information, and reaches out for more takes an interest in it."—*Outlines of Educational Doctrine*, p. 44. (See also, *Science of Education*, p. 62.)

3 To Pestalozzi Herbart owed, in part, the doctrine of interest, but he elaborated and transformed it. He maintains that Pestalozzi's service to education lay in his recognition of the need of creating in the child a definite and clearly observed experience; that we should not act as though the child had a body of experience, but see to it that he get one. In the doctrine of interest put forward by Herbart and its emphasis on the claims of the individual, traces may be found of the influence of Rousseau working through the ideas of Pestalozzi.

(a) According to Herbart, "ideas spring from two main sources,—experience and social intercourse. Knowledge of nature—incomplete and crude—is derived from the former; the latter furnishes the sentiments entertained towards our fellow-men, which, far from being praiseworthy, are on the contrary often very reprehensible. To improve these is the more urgent task; but neither ought we to neglect the knowledge of nature." Ideas gained from experience and social intercourse constitute the child's *circle of thought*, which is to be so formed by instruction that right judgment and right willing may grow out of it. "Man's worth does not, it is true, lie in his knowing, but in his willing. But there is no such thing as an independent faculty of will. Volition has its roots in thought; not, indeed, in the details one knows, but certainly in the combination and total effect of the acquired ideas."—*Outlines of Educational Doctrine*, p. 40.

(b) The aim of instruction is "so to form the pupil's circle of thought that right judgment and right willing may grow out of it." Its *specific* object is to stimulate and develop many-sided interests. The procedure of instruction with reference to the circle of thought of the pupil is either (1) analytic or (2) synthetic.

(c) The circle of thought gained from (1) experience, (2) intercourse, lends itself to the development of two main forms of interest, (1) of cognition, (2) of participation. With reference to the circle of thought educative instruction develops as (1) *interests of cognition*, the spirit of observation (empirical), of speculation (scientific), of taste (æsthetic); as (2) *interests of participation*, i.e., love and feeling of dependence upon others, sympathetic participation (sympathetic), public spirit (social), religiousness (religious).

(d) Interest as the specific object of instruction has four qualities. It is (1) far-reaching or continuous, (2) immediate, *i.e.*, it must be its own reward. The activity of true interest must arise from a disinterested devotion to the subject in hand. (3) Many-sided. "Interest arises from interesting objects; many-sided interests originate in the wealth of these, and to create and develop it is the task of instruction."—*Science of Education*, p. 120. (4) Proportionate. There should be balance among the various classes of interest.

(e) Methodical instruction involves (1) *clearness*,—in presentation of specific facts, or the elements to be learned; (2) *association*,—of these facts with one another and with other related facts, formerly acquired, in order that assimilation and apperception may be as complete as possible; (3) *system*,—the coherent ordering of what is associated; (4) *method*,—the application in exercises, involving the activity of the pupil, of the facts, rules, principles, and classification so obtained.

(f) For Herbart, as has been noted, experience and intercourse are the two constant teachers of men. These are the two original sources of the mental life. The ideas gained from these two sources must form the apperceptive basis of the instruction process in the school. Starting, then, with this apperceptive basis, presentative instruction takes two main lines: (1) *the natural-scientific*, including geography, mathematics, and natural history, serve to supplement almost exclusively the experience of the pupil and hence supply the sources of interests of knowledge or cognition; (2) *the historical*, including history, literature, language, and art, serve to supplement both the pupil's experience and intercourse with others, and supply the sources of the interests of participation or association with others.

4 (a) Herbart, as was noted above, denied that the mind is possessed of certain innate powers or activities. (1) The doctrine of faculties has its origin in the tendency to treat what were merely the prominent classes of mental states as real forces or activities producing particular effects. (2) Nor can we accept the Kantian notion of the Ego or Self as a synthetic activity formative in the upbuilding of the experience-process.

(b) Presentations or ideas within the mind disturb and inhibit one another, and the entire psychical life is to be explained

as a reciprocal tension of ideas. This fact of tension causes ideas to lose in intensity, and those of lower degree of strength tend to be forced below the threshold of consciousness. Although an idea displaced by another of superior strength fades or sinks below the threshold of consciousness, it does not by any means disappear from the soul, but may presently rise again to clear and distinct consciousness. Every idea persists in the soul: its displacement in consciousness by another does not annihilate it: it but renders it latent.

(c) Herbart lays a particular stress upon the nature of the process by which newly entering presentations or ideas are "assimilated, ordered, formed, and in part altered" by the ideas already present in the mind. The importance of his work in this connection should be fully recognized. He makes use of the term 'Apperception' to designate the general process by which individual perceptions, ideas or complexes of ideas, are brought into relation to our previously existing system of ideas, and, assimilating with them, are raised to greater clearness and distinctness. This is a central thought in the system of Herbart, from which he proceeds and to which he continually returns. In his philosophical explanation he took as his starting-point certain thoughts of Leibnitz, while in its educational interpretation he was undoubtedly influenced by Pestalozzi.

(d) For Herbart, then, it is possible to explain mental development by means of the one comprehensive process of *Apperception*. By it he seems to understand the interaction of two analogous presentations or ideas or groups of either, in such a way that the one is more or less transformed or reconstructed by the other, and ultimately fused with it. The process, therefore, is one (1) of assimilation, in which the new is fused and incorporated with the old; (2) of reconstruction, through which previously existing ideas are raised to greater clearness and distinctness, and thus to a higher degree of consciousness.

(e) Apperception as the essential process in mental development becomes, therefore, for the Herbartian, the essential basis of educational method. Without asking the question for the present whether Apperception is a complete explanation of mental development, it may at least be admitted (1) that our knowledge, whether as identification, comparison, or subsump-

tion, is a process of associating the new with the old; (2) that in the interaction of the new and the old in the knowledge process, the new is assimilated according to the individual's previously existing system of ideas, and the old transformed or reconstructed in the light of the new; (3) that, in order to the control of experience through instruction (i) all new knowledge must be the development and reconstruction of previous knowledge, (ii) on a level with the pupil's experience, neither too new nor too strange, (iii) the presented material must be given in organized groups or series.

5. (a) It would seem to be fair to summarize Herbart's contribution to educational theory under the following headings: (1) His contention that both nature and mind are characterized by conformity to law. (2) His statement of the educational foundations, psychology, and ethics. (3) His insistence on morality, or virtue, as the aim of education and upon the connection between intellectual and moral development. (4) His reconstruction of the doctrine of Apperception as a fundamental principle in educative instruction. (5) His conception of interest as a factor in instruction. (6) His analysis of the formal steps in the instruction-process. It is not, of course, asserted that Herbart in any one of these lines was wholly original, but the definiteness with which he stated the problems and indicated their interrelations has forced upon subsequent writers in educational theory a consciousness of the need of their still clearer definition and fuller reconstruction.

(b) Over against the doctrine of Pluralism as held by Herbart we may, for purposes of comparison, set in outline the general position of Idealism against which Herbart strenuously contended. Idealism, it may be said, maintains: (1) Each finite thing or being is part of a larger system. (2) Each finite thing or being is a positive self-affirming unity, possessing its own peculiar life and activity. (3) The impulse or endeavor of each finite thing or being (an expression of the Absolute in a definite and determinate way) to maintain itself in existence, to realize itself according to its own peculiar life and activity, is the actual essence of the thing or being. (4) In all things and beings this general principle of expression, manifestation, or real-

ization is the same—but with the human being it is the same with a difference. *For man becomes conscious of his self-realizing impulse.* Thus the life open to him is indefinitely richer in content than that bestowed on any other creature—the life of intelligence, of social relationships, of religion. If Herbart had recognized the significance or the implications of certain of his own admissions, (1) that we cannot but conceive the Reals in analogy with our own inner states, (2) that there is no unconnected manifold in consciousness, his Realism would doubtless have been considerably more in harmony with Idealism than it is.

(c) Herbart contends that the science of the reality of things (*metaphysic*) must be kept entirely apart from the science of the estimation of worth (*æsthetic*). There is, he maintains against the Idealists, no principle of knowledge which can unite in itself the *explanation of reality* and the *proof of worth*. Metaphysics ends with the assumption of Reals existing out of all relations: *Æsthetics* (*i.e.*, the science of the estimation of worth, æsthetic or ethical) is concerned not with realities, but with relations between realities. It will, therefore, be recognized that Herbart fails to establish any organic or fundamental connection between his metaphysics and psychology on the one side and his ethics, dealing with relations of worth among volitions, on the other; between what is and what ought to be. His ethics, being fundamentally æsthetic in character, however much they may be said to center about the will and activity of an agent, do not have their ultimate foundation in the will nor in the concept of an end or ideal which ought to be striven for. He does not, in other words, with his disciple Lotze, find in what ought to be the basis of that which is. Herbart's ethics and theology are united in a manner quite as external as are those of Kant.

(d) It must be acknowledged, moreover, that Herbart's account of the formal simplicity of the soul's nature presents a rather serious menace to the acceptance of his psychology as a basis of educational method. In his account of the nature of the soul he, apparently, at first abandons entirely the thought of activity. It is, to begin with, alien to all relations and needs them not,—does not need, indeed, to maintain itself against

them. In the exigencies of explanation Herbart endows the soul with a kind of activity, that of acting in self-defence. Just here, it may be asked, does not he unconsciously assume what he had to begin with consciously rejected, namely, self-activity?

The soul, endowed with the power of self-conservation, reacts and incorporates the antithetical "reals" as presentations. But by introducing into the soul the power of self-maintenance against opposing "reals" Herbart is confronted with a dilemma: (1) either there is mere antagonism which would lead to nothing—not even presentation, or (2) the soul and that by which it is confronted are positive elements in a larger life or process from which the soul draws (under the guidance of an indwelling unity) an outside element which it responds to, assimilates, and thus makes instrumental in its own development. By denying to the soul a synthetic principle, or neglecting the significance of the union of elements within consciousness, Herbart, it would appear, either fails to explain, or explains away, individuality.

But for Herbart the soul's power of self-conservation is at best an endowment of only short duration. If the soul was ever active in its assertion against the stimuli which came from without, it never was active but once. As Lotze, Herbart's most distinguished disciple, remarks, "Everything further that happens in it, the formation of its conceptions, the development of the various faculties, the settlement of the principles on which it acts, are all mechanical results which, when once these primary self-preservations have been aroused, follow from their own reactions; and the soul, the arena on which all this takes place, never shows itself volcanic and irritable enough to interfere by new reactions with the play of its states and to give them such new directions as do not follow analytically from them according to the universal laws of their reciprocal actions."

(e) Into Herbart's account of interest and attention, moreover, grave inconsistencies seem to enter, even though it be freely admitted that from the point of view of educational theory it has a considerable amount of suggestion. If we abide by psychology as an educational foundation, it is necessary to have a certain consistency between the foundation and the super-

structure. If we should abide by Herbart's psychology, interest and attention would be the result of certain combinations of ideas—purely reflex things: *e.g.*, the sentence, "I am attentive to something" would mean that the idea of this something rises into consciousness by its own strength. In his educational theory, however, Herbart comes to speak of both attention and interest as forms of self-activity. How, it may be asked, if the idea be primary and self-existent as at first decided, can we say that attention and interest are forms of self-activity? In the one case it is the mere product of the action and reaction of ideas; in the other it is *psychical*, or *self-activity*.

(f) There have been three important historical conceptions in psychology: (1) the conception of the inner life as the expression or manifestation of a number of distinct faculties or powers with which the subject is endowed; (2) the conception of which the Herbartian and the English Associationist doctrines are typical; (3) the conception which represents the mental life as a development, the varying forms of which are to be represented as stages of the development itself. Instead of giving a categorical denial to the Herbartian theory of interest and attention as mere products of the action and reaction of ideas, it may be well to place over against the Herbartian psychology an outline of a psychology of a different type which seems to afford a more secure foundation for both interest and attention, and, on the whole, one more conformable to the facts of experience. The outline, sufficient for our present purpose, may be given as follows: (1) The mental life presents itself as a teleological system or process, a series of means and ends, the outcome of a continuous co-ordination or functioning of two elements, *self* and *environment*, the unity of which is found in the general process of control over the conditions of life. The self is a concrete, specific activity, constantly directed to the accomplishment of something,—not only the bearer of the experience process, but an efficient agent in its furtherance. The self is real only in so far as it continues to act, to become, to progress. (2) The fundamental and central element of the psychical life is not sensation or idea, but activity. From this point of view all phases of psychical activity may be grouped about two fundamental types—*Habits* and *Accommodations*. (3)

Ideas are not (as Herbart would appear to hold) things which stand apart from the subject, in mechanical juxtaposition to the self, but are instrumental in the furtherance of the life-process. They are (i) methods of registering past experiences, and (ii) plans of action, leading to the organization of future experience. Knowledge is teleological, functional. Sensations and ideas are instrumental. Herbart's atomic theory of ideas (as, ultimately, his theory of the individual self) is analogous to the political and social theories of Rousseau.

(g) If the third conception of mental life, outlined in the preceding section, be the one more conformable to the facts of experience, it would seem that interest and attention have their foundation not in the action and reaction of ideas, but in the adjustments and accommodations of the self in the process of its realization. They are functions of the active subject,—a subject whose very essence lies in its activity, its manifestation, its self-expression. It is in connection with *the realization of ends* that the phenomenon of interest manifests itself. In it are discovered (1) a cognitive, (2) a dynamic or impulsive aspect, and (3) an inner or subjective feeling of the worth of the end to which the attention is directed. Interest is the emotional or subjective value which accompanies the self's identification with an end or object deemed necessary to its realization or expression. (For a discussion of the psychology of *interest*, see articles by Professor Dewey and Dr. Harris noted in bibliography of this section.)

(h) May it not be contended that, if Herbart's account of the totally indifferent nature of the soul be correct, it is possible for the educator to make out of it what he desires? His psychology is rather the psychology of the 'learning' process than of a human being. If it were strictly true that knowledge is primary, Herbart's theory of virtue or morality becomes simply the Socratic doctrine that knowledge is virtue, stated in terms of a mechanical psychology. To control the individual's action it would only be necessary to furnish the right presentation, and through correlation reinforce this one by allied and congruous ideas in such a way that the focus of consciousness could be maintained by the allied idea-forces. Teaching would thus become a mere matter of idea-instilling, and psychological in-

quiry a search for the mechanism of the process. Through presentation determine mental content; through mental content determine desire; through desire determine activity. The monad soul is at first practically at the mercy of the external world. By multiplying the individual's ideas in the right way you are determining what his desires and motives shall be, and thus his conduct. "I confess," Herbart says, "to have no conception of education without instruction." From what precedes, namely, (1) the dependence of will on ideas, (2) ideas as distinct entities possessing various degrees of force, (3) similar and congruous ideas tending to form alliances among themselves, it will be recognized how necessary for a theory of instruction based upon a psychology of this intellectualistic type is (1) the control of ideas, through orderly presentation (*apperception*), and through reinforcement (*correlation*), (2) the enrichment of the circle of thought through *concentration* on ethical ideas, and through amplification of the educative materials.

Throughout his account of the mental life, Herbart seems to over-emphasize the intellectual aspect, and to under-estimate the significance of activity, feeling, purpose, and habit, and the natural correlating power of the mind based on its original instinctive and impulsive equipment. The doctrine of Presentationism has its foundations in a dualistic theory of knowledge (see account of Kant's theory of knowledge, Chap. III, sec. 5; also Chap. VI, sec. 4.) It undervalues, moreover, the significance of direct, personal experience, and knowledge gained through the exercise of the constructive activities on the part of the learner.

REFERENCES:

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Further problems for study:

1. Herbart's relation to (i) Kant, (ii) Fichte, (iii) Pestalozzi.
2. The bearings of the Intellectualistic and Voluntaristic psychologies on educational theory.
3. The relation of interest and purpose to apperception.
4. Herbart's doctrine of Interest.
5. How far is the Culture Epoch theory consistent with Herbart's view of the nature of the soul?
6. Comparison of Hegel's and Herbart's views of mind.
7. The influence of Herbart's 'Pluralism' on his psychological, ethical, and educational theories.
8. The individual and the social in Herbart's ethics.
9. The relation between Herbart's *A B C of Sense-Perception* and Froebel's theory of the *Gifts*.

VIII

THE EDUCATIONAL THEORIES OF FROEBEL

1. While Froebel (1782-1852) never succeeded in giving to his thought the rounded completeness of scientific system which characterized the work of Herbart, nevertheless his educational theories presuppose a more or less definite philosophical creed, the dominant ideas of which were the common property of the romantic-idealistic movement to which he belonged. It is therefore necessary, first of all, to indicate the more important philosophic foundations of his educational doctrines:

(a) *The conception of Reality, or the world, as an organic unity.*—Throughout his work Froebel conceives of the manifold of existence as a single process. His position may be characterized as a humanized Idealism, or a spiritualized Naturalism,—Reality, conceived as a movement of Absolute Life. With Schleiermacher, it is true, he tends to regard the religious conviction of the unity of things as the final guarantee of the truth postulated by philosophy. To any system of atomism which regards a unity or whole as a mere aggregate of its independent parts the thought of Froebel is absolutely opposed. The universe in spite of its multiplicity is one. By itself the world is plurality: at best an aggregate: it is the totality of being, conceived in its differentiation. But it is a universe or cosmos because it has its being in a spiritual principle, in God. Reality is thus for Froebel an organic unity; a unity, *i.e.*, whose differ-

ences are its own determinations. Because of their origin in a common world-ground, all things constitute a living unity; a unity, nevertheless, in which each thing is also an individual, distinct from all others. Accordingly, every element or member of any unity, natural or human, must be evidenced in a twofold way: from the side of its independence, self-sufficiency, and exclusiveness, as well as from the side of its dependence upon the larger whole of which it forms a part.

(b) *The corollary of the first, namely, development.*—The two ideas reciprocally supplement each other. Into Froebel's conception of organic unity enters the thought of manifold elements, individual existences, and activities. To admit such differentiation within unity, implies a dynamic, not a static, view of reality. The reality of the world implies the continuous self-determination of a spiritual principle, and this very self-determination involves the process whereby the world is maintained as an organic whole. By development Froebel understands the tendency of any unity, absolute or finite, to differentiate itself into a manifold while still retaining its unity. This process is found in the plant, in the animal, in the individual and society. Through this process of development the one passes into a manifold: in differentiating itself it individualizes and also realizes itself.

(c) *The principle of activity.*—The end or purpose of each individual life is to realize itself as an element of the larger system to which it belongs, ultimately of the larger organism of Reality. For man, the end is to come into harmonious relation with nature and humanity, and with God, the immanent life of both. This can be attained by him only through the exercise of his own activity or power of self-determination. What the self is to be, it must become for itself.

[For a fuller account of these principles as interpreted by Froebel, see *Teachers College Record*, November, 1903, pp. 16-36. For materials concerning the development of Froebel's thought and its relation to the philosophical and ethical tendencies in the Germany of his day, see translations by Michaelis and Moore of the *Autobiography of Friedrich Froebel*, of Froebel's *Letters*, and of Froebel's *Letter to Krause*; various papers translated in Barnard, *Child Study Papers* (articles by Fichte, Lange, and others); Blow,

Introduction to Mottoes and Commentaries of Froebel's Mother Play, Hanschmann, *Friedrich Froebel* (translated under the title, 'The Kindergarten System,' by Franks), also, *Pädagogische Strömungen: Eine Würdigung Pestalozzis, Fröbels, Zillers*; Harris, *Introductions to translations of Froebel's works*; Von Marenholtz-Bulow, *Reminiscences of Froebel*; Articles in *Erziehung der Gegenwart*; Diesterweg's *Jahrbuch*; *Rheinische Blätter für Erziehung und Unterricht*; *Kindergarten*; *Pädagogium* (articles by Dittes and Morf); Encyclopædias of Pedagogy (with bibliographical references) of K. A. Schmid, Karl Schmidt, Sander, Rein, and Lindner; Seidel, *Introductions to his edition of Froebel's works*; Steglich, *Ueber die pädagogische Idee Friedrich Froebels in ihrer philosophischen Begründung durch Frohschammer*.

For the work of Krause (1781-1832) Froebel seems to have had most liking, and from him it would appear borrowed a considerable amount of his technical phraseology. Krause sought to improve upon the pantheism of the system of Identity through his doctrine of *Panentheism*—a philosophy founded on the notion that *all things are in God*. Concerning the relation between Krause and Froebel, see especially Krause, *Das Urbild der Menschheit*, also, *Tagblatt des Menschheitslebens*; also, Eucken, *Zur Erinnerung an Krause*; Hohlfeld, *Ueber Krause und Froebel*; Schliephake, *Ueber Friedrich Froebels Erziehungslehre*. The chief points in which a comparison between Krause and Froebel might be instituted are the following: their views concerning (1) the personality of God, (2) nature, (3) the relation of nature to the Absolute, (4) man, (5) the community and solidarity of humanity, (6) the aim of education, (7) the supremacy of will over intellect, (8) religion as the supreme mode of self-realization, (9) the 'mediation of opposites.' The idea underlying Froebel's conception of *mediation*, while a common possession of the period, was by him derived in part from Krause.

In reading Froebel's *Autobiography*, note the significance of his contact with nature in his personal life, and compare with the *Prelude* of Wordsworth and the *Alastor* of Shelley. For Froebel, as for the youth in *Alastor*:

"Every sight
And sound from the vast earth and ambient air
Sent to his heart its choicest impulses."

Concerning Froebel's attempts towards an interpretation of nature, materials will be found scattered throughout his works, especially the *Education of Man*. No wholly consistent interpretation will be discovered, though many exceedingly suggestive things are said. (1) In certain places an interpretation is given reminding one of the Wordsworthian. (2) But, as Dr. Harris has frequently pointed out, Froebel was not a poet so much as a re-

ligious mystic, and frequently, perhaps most frequently, we find in his works the Romantic impulse uppermost,—to revel in a *content of consciousness* by such as Froebel and Schleiermacher won through *religious* rather than *æsthetic* intuitions and symbols. (3) Sometimes he essays a mathematical construction of nature—apparently because the mathematical were the only sciences which had been given systematic form—as Herbart and others had attempted. (4) Again, he believed that he found the morphological element in *crystallization* as did Rosenkranz in his *Hegel's Naturphilosophie*. Froebel, it is true, recognized with Idealism that the law of thought is the law of the cosmos, but with the Romantic philosophers was, it would appear, unable critically to distinguish between consciousness and its content, and to realize the necessity of an *epistemological interpretation* of the relation and adaptation of nature to mind. Froebel accepts nature as an immediately given reality: Epistemology seeks an answer to the question, *How can it be given to us?* This constitutes a serious deficiency in his philosophy of education. See also section II. On the position of the sciences in the time of Froebel, as well as for an account of various philosophies of nature attempted at the time, see Merz, *The History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*.]

2. (a) From what was said in the preceding section it will be apparent why Froebel should take as the basis of his psychology the notion of the self or person as *an individualization of the Universal Life or Reason*. [This individuality may be modified and developed through education, but never completely changed.] From temperament, from introspective study, from the influences of Romanticism and of Idealism which came to him in the spiritual environment of his day, Froebel had developed a profound but somewhat mystical view of the inner depths of the human personality. He found it quite impossible to separate distinctly his psychology from his philosophy. For him, as for Schleiermacher, within each individual there is the capacity of becoming a specific expression of the world, at once *a compendium and a specific expression* of the life of humanity, a microcosmus of the enveloping macrocosmus. The child is to be regarded “as a struggling expression of an inner, divine law,” and therefore education in its most comprehensive sense consists in “leading man as a thinking, intelligent being, growing into self-consciousness to a pure and unsullied, conscious, and free representation of the inner law of divine Unity, and in

teaching him ways and means thereto."—*Education of Man*, sec. 2.

(b) In every part of nature, life and growth appeared to Froebel as a progressive development from lower to higher grades of being. The essential feature of mind is activity: the ego is not something which must exist before it can put forth its activities. The mind is a process, not a mere succession of states. The development of mind is the gradual manifestation of inner purposes, not the gradual modification of images and associations through the entrance of elements from without. [See Chap. VII, sec. 1 (d).] For him, from one point of view mental growth and development are the growth and development of self-consciousness and through this development the individual becomes aware of his essence. While this consciousness of self is possible only through and is continually dependent on the consciousness of the outer (nature and society), nevertheless Froebel does not regard the inner (or mind) as externally determined; rather he maintains that through consciousness, the individual may continually emancipate himself from the law of external influence, thereby making the material, or nature, from which his life seems to start, through whose very oppositions and antagonisms he is lifted to a consciousness of himself, and which he comes more and more to make instrumental to his purposes, the very medium for the attainment of spiritual freedom. Froebel, for the most part, insists upon the organic relation between nature and spirit. He does not say that man is merely natural, nor will he admit that man can get along without the natural. As was said above, mental development is for him fundamentally an unfolding of a system of inner aims which, instead of merely representing, or conforming to environment, more and more make environment the instrument of self-realization.

(c) "If we strive to grasp in a common unity this process of development we find an element which manifests itself in the following forms: (1) as a germinating and developing power, working from within outward; (2) as a receptive power, from without inward; (3) as an assimilative and formative energy, a synthesis of the preceding forms. Thus the pivot upon which all turns is the recognition of life, of activity." Froebel, ac-

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cordingly, regards activity as the ultimate feature of the mental life. The soul is an activity, influenced by its surroundings and reacting upon them; thereby adjusting itself to an ever-widening environment. Intelligence, that is, perception, memory, thought, is for Froebel (at least for the most part throughout his writings) *instrumental* to the life-process. With the Voluntarist Froebel would maintain that the ultimate basis for the activity of cognition is furnished by the will. (See also section 12.)

3. Froebel never worked out with any attempt at logical precision a theory of ethics or of society. Nevertheless, fundamental to his thought are certain well-defined convictions concerning *the nature of the self, the normal constitution of man, and therewith his relation to the social and moral order of which he forms a part*. Froebel's social and ethical theory is of course a part of his general philosophy of life. It is of the type of ethical idealism throughout. While having its foundations in religion (as with Leibnitz, Lessing, Kant, and Schleiermacher), yet the right and the good are as *autonomous* for Froebel as for Kant. "We weaken and degrade the human nature we should strengthen and raise, when we dangle before it a bait to good action, even though this bait be hung out from another world. In using an external stimulus, however seemingly spiritual, to call forth a better life, we leave undeveloped that active and independent inward force which is implanted within every man for the manifestation of ideal humanity." His ethical and social doctrines have their religious foundations in the conception of *evolution as the revelation of God*. Only in such a conception can we understand the facts of the individual life from infancy to maturity: only on this basis can we appreciate *the fact of harmony and union between the individual and the processes of nature and human history*. The individual soul, nature, and humanity, are interrelated elements in one spiritual process, to be understood only in relation to one another and in the light of the end towards which they seem all to be tending. In answer to the question, How to adjust the individual, who is always implicitly more than a mere individual, to the larger life in which he must move and have his being, Froebel would reply, that human life, and hence the educative process, is possible and intelligible only on the assumption that both the self and the world, mind and

nature, personality and environment, have their origin in the intelligent purpose of one universal, spiritual principle; and only on the basis of such *kinship between the essential nature of the soul and of that wider life upon which the soul enters*, is it possible to render an account of the education of the human spirit.

It was noted above that for Froebel the growth of personality is a process of increasing complexity of individuality through participation in a wider life. On the other hand, for him as for Kant and Fichte, the soul must build its own world, its own representation of the macrocosm. The soul is not a simple resting identity: *it is not something which has activity: it is activity*. For Froebel as for Fichte the life of the soul is a *continual process of activity* through which it attains self-knowledge and self-realization. For both, moreover, as Froebel declares "the true origin of man's activity and creativeness lies in his unceasing impulse to embody outside himself the divine and spiritual element within him." For Froebel, Schleiermacher, and Fichte, again, we may say in Froebel's words, "Religion without work is apt to degenerate into empty dreaming and purposeless emotion, while, on the other hand, work without religion tends to degrade man into a machine. . . . Work and religion are coeval,—as God, the Eternal, creates throughout all eternity." The soul is self-determining, moreover, *in spite of, and yet by means of*, opposition. The opposition of nature and society to the development of the intellectual and moral life of the individual is, however, only apparent. These, indeed, are the means by which this very development is rendered possible. For Froebel, as for Idealists generally, the life of the individual is the process whereby in knowing the objective world, he learns to know himself: and he realizes himself only as he becomes a part of the life of nature and of humanity as embodied in the great forms of institutional life,—only as he becomes the agent of a divine purpose to which all things ultimately contribute. The course of the upward movement in the spiritual life, therefore, is one of self-estrangement and self-surrender. Only through a continual process of self-surrender to the life of nature and of humanity does man attain to a consciousness of the latent wealth of the inner life.

4. It will be apparent, then, why the life process of the

individual, and therefore, the educational process, should be conceived by Froebel as essentially a social process with its complementary phases: (1) increasing individualization and self-realization through activity, and (2) increasing participation in the various forms of institutional life, home, school, society, state, and church, in which the mind of the race has manifested itself. For him each one of *the various human institutions constitute at once a system of control, and a medium for the activity of the individual*, specific in function yet rendering to the other complementary and necessary service. "Thus enriching his (the individual's) own life by the life of others, he solves the problem of development." According to Froebel, moreover, the values, habits, norms, or ideals which interpret, organize, and enrich the experience of the individual are socially mediated. They do not get to the individual save as they are mediated by social agencies. To put it briefly, the individual can be educated only in the presence of other human beings. The conception of the educational process as one through which the spiritual possessions of humanity are mediated by the various social agencies, while not wholly original with Froebel, yet in him attained to clear consciousness and reasonably definite statement. While he was never able to work out completely this idea of the mediation of the spiritual possessions, yet he achieved it in a unique way so far as concerns the first six years of the child's life, through his conception of the home, with the mother as teacher, and of the kindergarten, which is through and through a social institution,—an agency for the mediation of experiences by means of the child's characteristic activity in that particular period. It cannot be doubted that Froebel for the most part kept clearly in mind throughout his work this idea of *the educational process as a process of interaction*, a process by which the spiritual experience, the ideal values of human life, are mediated or communicated to the individual. There are places in his writings in which, as will be pointed out in a subsequent section, he seems to abandon this conception for the intellectualistic view, but this is certainly not in harmony with his general position. Here *we must abide by the principle of Froebel's thought*, clearly separating it from the matter of detail or its imperfect application.

For example, in the *Mother-Play*, his 'most triumphant achievement,' it may be noted how Froebel works out the idea of education as a process of interaction between the two factors of the experience-process, society and the individual, represented by the mother and child. On the one side you have the child with its impulses, tendencies-to-things, and tendencies-from-things; to begin with for the most part at the mercy of his environment. The child contributes the impulse, the need, the unformed activity; the mother (who represents the social or normative side of the process) contributes the direction, the habitual form, the value or interpretation. As Miss Blow expresses it, Froebel *sought for the point of contact between the manifested needs of the one and the instinctive effort of the other to meet such needs.* The child and the mother (or what the mother through *thinking love* does for her child), for Froebel in his *Mother-Play*, therefore, are the terminal aspects of a unitary educational process. What Froebel would have the mother do, therefore, is so to correct, organize, and enrich the child's crude but very real experiences, that its experience at any moment may be full and rich and therefore preparatory to a still fuller and richer experience in the future.

(a) In a fuller discussion than can be attempted in the present outline of Froebel's conception of education as a process of interaction between the two factors of the *experience*, and thus necessarily of the *educational*, process, (1) society (the *corporate* aspect, represented by the mother, teacher, studies, etc.) and (2) the individual (representing the differentiated, the individualizing phase) there should in justice to him be noted his treatment of at least the following points: (1) The nature of individuality; Froebel's conception of the 'self.' Compare with the views of Fichte and Schleiermacher. (2) Consciousness as belonging "to the nature of man and as one with it." Compare the general idealistic position as outlined in Chapter V. (3) The primitive unity of experience and its gradual differentiation and integration through the natural impulse to activity; the impulse to activity finding expression first of all through a system of natural instincts. Compare the method by which Fichte, Schleiermacher and Froebel effect the transition between *spirit and nature*, the realization of a spiritual principle in

a so-called empirical world. For Froebel, as for Fichte, freedom depends on activity and reflection, and for both the ethical law is "*each particular action should form part of a series which leads the individual to spiritual freedom.*" (4) The relation of knowledge to will. The tendency of Froebel's psychology is to regard the system of our ideas as dependent upon our impulses and our will. (5) The relation of the individual to institutions. (6) The conception of play as mediatory. (7) The significance of the imitative and play activities. (8) Studies as representing the typical human interests and activities, and the corporate side of human life. (9) The notion that educative intellectual activity is attained through the *definition of contrasts or opposites* demanding mediation and unification, thereby leading to the ultimate establishment of harmony. In the light of preceding chapters it is needless to say that the conception of consciousness upon which this theory of Froebel is based was,—through the application of the organic mode of interpretation consequent upon the failure of the mere logical principle of identity to afford an explanation of psychical life,—a commonplace in the idealistic and romantic philosophy of the period: the conception, namely, of consciousness as an organic unity, an indissoluble unity of opposites. Kant and Fichte had applied the conception in their interpretation of the *structure of consciousness as such*; Schelling and the Romantics applied it in their interpretation of the *content of consciousness*; Hegel, combining the speculative temper with a realistic interest in nature and history, and attempting to unify consciousness and its content, applied the conception as an expression of the *method* of all spiritual achievement. That Froebel did not completely grasp the conception in its *philosophic implications* is evidenced by the fact that at times (1) with Schelling (*i.e.*, Schelling's later writings), he accepts the position, "the reality of object and subject is strictly coördinate," and at times (2) the Hegelian position, according to which in consciousness is a unity presupposed in and yet transcending the difference between subject and object, mind and matter. The former position leads directly to pantheism and agnosticism, as with Spinoza and Spencer: and it must be admitted that *from the point of view of their philosophy*, in *idea* if not in *spirit*, Froebel and Schelling did not escape the diffi-

culty of merging all differences in absolute oneness. The second point of view, that of *the immanence and transcendence of consciousness*, is the position of theistic idealism,—*undoubtedly the position which Froebel strove to occupy*. Becoming possessed of this conception, *the reconciliation of opposites*, and by temperament and training inclining to an idea which might embrace the educational process in its totality, Froebel made it the constitutive and regulative principle of education. When, with Fichte, he emphasizes oppositions, antagonisms, or a system of limits, as the condition of activity, effort, work, and self-development, Froebel is surely on the right track: but when, with Schelling, he seems to emphasize and define disparates, oppositions, and contrasts (without having afforded a consistent logic of the process of differentiation), apparently to give relief and color to his idea rather than to the reality, he is, to say the least, on dangerous ground. The validity of the philosophical principle which underlies Froebel's doctrine of the mediation or reconciliation of opposites is not here in question. (See *Teachers College Record*, Nov., 1903, pp. 22-23; also compare modern interpretations of consciousness). The problem is rather one of interpretation of the principle, and the critical estimation of *Froebel's use of it as a fundamental principle in educational theory*. Krause made some approach to a logical or systematic deduction of the principle: it does not appear that Froebel recognized the necessity of any such deduction.

✓ (b) In a study of Froebel's interpretation of the educational significance of play and games, it would be necessary to note in some detail the following points: (1) His essential originality in his attempts to make play educationally significant. (2) His conception of play as the "self-active representation of the inner life from inner necessity and impulse." (3) Theories of the origin of play. (4) Play as self-expression and as revealing the nature of the child. (5) Types of the play-activity according to Froebel: the play-world of the child as *symbol*. (6) Play in relation to *art* and *work*: the so-called dialectic of play, work, and art. The transition from play to work. (7) The *individual* and *social* significance of imitation. The child's perception of relations, external first of all, then causal. The transition from imitation to originality through the *appropria-*

tion of the principle of the thing or process imitated. (8) Organized play as educative: the *individual* and the *generic* self. Educative significance found in (i) rendering the body the more adequate *instrument and expression of the soul*, (ii) affording opportunity for the *perception of relations*, and thus a means of self-control through the organization of intelligence, (iii) reproducing typical forms of human activity, thereby affording a means of social preparation through the cultivation of social judgments, dispositions, and activities. (See Blow, *Introduction to Mottoes and Commentaries of Froebel's Mother-Play*; also, *Letters to a Mother*. Compare also Froebel's treatment of play with that found in Baldwin, *Mental Development: Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 139-147; Groos, *The Play of Man*, pp. 361-406; Sully, *Studies in Childhood*, pp. 33-51.)

(c) In Froebel's analysis and interpretation of the chief groups of subjects of instruction, note: (1) His conception of (i) the continuity of experience, (ii) the differentiation and integration of experience, (iii) social experience as a spiritual organism. (2) Studies as modes of self-realization: processes rather than products educative. (3) Studies as forms of social experience. (4) His attempt to furnish a philosophy or psychology of the subject-matter of instruction; in other words, to indicate the "genesis of objects of study in order to discover the relation of such objects to the nourishment of mind." Science, art, number, language, occupations, plays and games, religion. The *interests* fundamental to his classification. (5) The course of study as the *selected and organized environment of the individual*. (6) His classification of studies in their relation to what Dr. Harris speaks of as Froebel's attempt to *organize a system of education that will unfold the rational self and chain down the irrational*.

5. In the consideration of one or two concrete illustrations of Froebel's theory of education it may be noted that first of all in the *Mother-Play* he appears to have had in mind three fairly well-defined ends: (1) to raise certain of the unconscious habits and activities, or the indefinite intuitions, of the mother into clear and reflective consciousness with a view to the control of the child's experience, and thereby his subsequent growth and development; (2) to indicate *within the experience of the child* an

element of rationality and the capacities and potencies of larger and richer relationships, and therewith a larger and richer experience; (3) to indicate how through simple pictures, conversations, songs, stories, and plays, the mother may present elements of an ideal to the feelings and imagination of the child and thus *consciously* assist in raising it, physically, intellectually, and morally, into harmony with that larger order of which its present experience is prophetic.

¶ 6. In the study of the kindergarten as a social institution consider: (1) Froebel's conception of human institutions, (i) the relation of the individual and the social, (ii) the nature of the social unity, (iii) society as a *system of purposes*, (iv) *the social significance of nature*, (v) social participation and increasing individualization, (vi) the relation of social order to social progress. Froebel's conception of the significance of the Family. "At present it is to the quiet and secluded sanctuary of the family that we must look for a revival of the divine spirit among mankind." (2) The *structure*, the specific *function*, and the *reality of the social life* within the kindergarten society. The view of *social organization as centering about activity*. (3) The kindergarten as mediating through its preparatory work by means of play between home and school. Continuity in the mental life; between home and school, between education and life. (4) The function of institutions in the *distribution and transmission of experience*. Compare the conceptions of Fichte and Pestalozzi. (5) Froebel's conception that the educational starting-point lies in the interests, needs, activities of the child, and of education as a process of social interaction (see section 4) through which the interests, activities, experiences of the individual are corrected, organized, amplified, and made significant through the reproduction in the kindergarten society of typical activities and experiences of the wider social life: in other words, that the *law which lives in social life, and the ideal worths towards which the wider social life is struggling*, are to become the law and deal of the kindergarten society. (6) His notion that *the best play-materials are the children themselves*. (7) The *principles underlying the selection of the materials of the kindergarten program*. (8) Froebel's *method* in relation to the ideal of the kindergarten society. (9) Habituation, Imitation and Sug-

gestion, and Instruction, and their respective functions. (10) The social significance of human labor. Compare the conceptions of Fichte and Schleiermacher. (11) The *idea* of the kindergarten and of democratic society. (12) The success of Froebel's adjustment of means to end in his system so far as he worked it out. (See Gilder, *The Kindergarten: An Uplifting Social Influence in the Home and the District*, in *Proceedings N. E. A.*, 1903; Harris, *The Kindergarten as a Preparation for the Highest Civilization*, *Proceedings of the International Kindergarten Union*, 1903.)

7. In the organization of the system of Gifts and Occupations Froebel seems to have had in view at least three fairly distinct ends: (1) Through the knowledge of their form, size, and number,—according to Froebel the characteristic qualities of all material objects,—to have the individual gain a comprehension of, an intellectual mastery over, the objects of the physical world. As Miss Blow expresses it: "The material used by kindergarten children for their productions has a geometric basis and is organized to illustrate numerical ratios. Becoming familiar with spheres, cubes, cylinders, circles, squares, oblongs, triangles, indeed all geometric planes and many geometric solids, the child learns to recognize them in the objects around him, while by constantly applying he is prepared to observe numerical relations. Since all form rests upon geometric archetypes, and all inorganic processes are governed by mathematics, the child's experiences with form and number give him the clue to inorganic nature. . . ." Furthermore: "The total series of the kindergarten gifts must illustrate in the evolution of geometric forms the general law of advance from an undifferentiated unit to those highly complex wholes wherein the most perfect unity is achieved through infinite differentiation and integration. For this reason the kindergarten gifts move from the sphere conceived as excluding to the sphere conceived as including all possible faces, corners, and edges, and to this movement of solid from sphere to sphere corresponds the evolution of geometric planes wherein the circle is both the terminus *ab. quo* and the terminus *ad quem* of a generative process, and the movement of lines from the curve will return thereto through the intersection of straight lines of different

inclinations. Each solid, plane, and line is therefore apprehended not in detached and solitary independence, but as an integral member of a related series. The exact place of each solid in the series is determined by its greater or less approximation to the sphere, the exact place of each plane by its greater or less approximation to the circle. The primary purpose of this organization of the kindergarten gifts is to lead toward the apprehension of all single geometric forms as members of an ascending system." (Compare the attempts to indicate how a *quantitative* mastery may be gained over inorganic nature made by Pestalozzi and Herbart.) (2) As a symbol of the development of self-consciousness, the common method of which Froebel conceived, as was noted above, to be a progressive mediation of opposites. From the point of view of educational material this common principle of mental development demands according to him the presentation to the individual of contrasts or opposites in form and their gradual elimination by means of intermediate series. (3) Through the self-active representation of typical (a) *life*, (b) *knowledge*, and (c) *beauty* forms to have the child's experiences organized and enriched in such a way that they are given not merely a meaning or a value but also that they become more and more under control, and the child becomes less and less at their mercy.

It is needless to say that Froebel's entire system of Gifts and Occupations is based upon a recognition of the motor character of consciousness. "Thought must clear itself in action and action resolve itself in thought." His aim was, undoubtedly, to maintain a balance between the intellectual and the practical. The child, he argues, makes or receives a plan, and then executes it; has a thought and embodies it in concrete form. It is interesting also to note in many sections of his writings the degree to which Froebel recognized the reaction of physical conditions upon conscious states. (See, e.g., *Mottoes and Commentaries of the Mother-Play*, English translation, p. 167-171.) His purpose in the Gifts and Occupations, then, from one point of view, might be said to be to secure or maintain a balance between the cognitive or intellectual and the volitional or practical aspects of the experience of the individual. As experiences for the child it is fair to say that the Gifts and Occupations are, according to

Froebel, primarily doings, activities, media for active, motor expressions through physical organs, eyes, hands, and the muscular system in general. But this very activity, Froebel claims, involves observation and attention, imagination, planning, thought, in order to the successful realization of some end. The materials are flexible, easily provided, and afford a stimulus to the growth and interplay of ideas, their increasing control, and continual embodiment in some form of activity. In addition to the argument concerning the value of the Gifts and Occupations, namely, that they aim to maintain a balance between the cognitive or intellectual and the practical sides of the experiences of the child, it should be conceded further that so far as Froebel in the Mother-Plays, and the Gifts, Occupations, and Games endeavored to have typical modes of human experience reproduced in the school, he was certainly on the track of one of the most fundamental and fruitful ideas in the entire course of educational theory. Over the working out of the system of Gifts and Occupations Froebel spent fifteen years. What he was trying to discover was the relation of these materials to the nourishment of mind. The principle, not the matter of detail or imperfect application, is the element of permanent significance and value. It is in the light of his fundamental principles that justification is found for Davidson's contention that "all future education must be built upon the foundation laid by Froebel." (See also sec. 11.)

8. In the consideration of Froebel's conception of symbolic education, note (1) the natural tendency towards symbolism of Froebel's mind and of the period, (2) the new conception of *the relations of the natural and the spiritual worlds*, (3) the nature of the child's mental imagery, (4) the mental tendency to unify in a "world," by means of symbols, the manifold of sense, (5) the tendency to interpret one experience by another, (6) *self-consciousness* and *objective consciousness*, (7) the symbol as a *self-projection*, (8) the symbol as based upon analogy, (9) the symbol as an approximation to the universal or type; (10) the symbol as mediatory of *social experience*, (11) the symbol as mediatory of the *technique of civilization*, (12) cosmic symbolism: the microcosm and macrocosm. *Nature as a divine sense-symbolism adapted to the use of man.*

9. In Froebel's conception of religion as affording the truest "world-view," and therefore, as *the fundamental disposition governing the individual's participation in the spiritual life of humanity*, and modifying the development of that life, note (1) its relation to the view of Schleiermacher. The *content* of the religious consciousness. (2) Emphasis of *creativity* as the fundamental attribute. (3) Religious interpretation of nature. (4) Religion and morality. (5) The religious element in the child-consciousness. The feeling of community. (6) Stages in religious development. (7) The religious motive. (8) Confirmation of philosophy in religion.

10. "The duty of each generation," Froebel once declared, "is to gather up the inheritance from the past, and thus to serve the present and prepare better things for the future." The essential question concerning any work is not, True or false? but rather, How much of truth has been brought to light, however inadequate at times its expression may be, and however imperfect the attempt has been to render its assumptions intelligible? Criticism of such a nature should enable us to attain a more satisfying because a more discriminating adherence to the thought of Froebel and to do full justice to it without enslaving our own. In attempting to interpret the permanent significance of Froebel's thought and work it is necessary to keep in mind certain general considerations: (1) His thought does not exhibit a systematic or logical unity so much as a unity of tendency and endeavor. The most interesting and valuable things in the life of an individual are his ideals. It is the motive, the informing purpose, that gives its consecration to life. Froebel's thought was, in its movement, essentially experimental and genetic. His theories were only gradually developed through his own life and writings. In many of his works, as he acknowledges, he was "breaking a path through unexplored regions of experience," and he recognized that his success "must necessarily be partial and imperfect." (2) In the study of his theories as developed by himself it is very often necessary to distinguish clearly between the principle and the matter of detail or particular application. (3) Only those principles may be accepted as of permanent significance which receive their justification in reason and experience. Methods of interpretation

and criticism based upon the *reconciling principle of development*, a principle underlying the thought of Froebel as well as that of the period in which his life was passed, and which constitutes one of the permanent achievements of its intellectual life, should enable us in the present to do justice even to the errors of the past and furnish a standard whereby to separate the permanent from the transitory, the spirit and the principle from the matter of detail or imperfect application. Such a principle of development is as hostile to an unwise conservatism as it is to a dogmatic criticism or overhasty reaction.

In an account of the permanent significance of Froebel's work for the theory of education there should, if space permitted, be emphasized the following points: (x) The conception of the theory of education as ultimately a philosophy of life. Education implies a theory of the proper conduct of life, and this, in turn, implies a theory of life based upon an examination of the nature of man and his place in the system of reality. The subject-matter of education is therefore as much an integral part of reality as that of any other science. For Froebel the purpose of education is one with the supreme purpose of life. Our conception of *becoming* is determined by our idea of the reality which underlies the process. Froebel's general position is that spiritual monism which conceives material and mental evolution as continuous phases of one spiritual movement. From the level of inanimate nature to that of human history it is one spiritual reality which manifests itself. The law, therefore, which reigns in nature, and the purpose revealed in human life *must be taken into the consciousness and made manifest in the life of the individual*. Education, accordingly, consists "in leading man, as a thinking, intelligent being, growing into self-consciousness, to a pure and unsullied, *conscious and free representation of the inner law of divine unity*, and in teaching him ways and means thereto." One cannot fail to be struck by the intensely moral tendency in all Froebel's thought. He regards all things, all processes, all materials, ultimately from the moral point of view. In this he is the disciple of Fichte and Schleiermacher rather than of Schelling. On the other hand, however, Froebel's interest is not ethical merely; it is every-

where and always deeply religious. In true religion he finds, with Schleiermacher, the foundation and final guarantee of the facts of the moral life. He maintains that in man, in virtue of the divine principle in him, the consciousness of God is bound up with the consciousness of himself: and if the Absolute be not manifest and revealed to us in the reality we know, it is for us nothing. It is questionable whether the true significance of Froebel's work can be understood until the religious motive fundamental to it all is fully recognized and appreciated. (2) A second point in Froebel's work which should be emphasized is his perception of the *social bearings* of the problems of educational theory, his recognition that a rational theory of education is related in a fundamental way to the spiritual interests of society. Froebel was ever alive to the need of keeping his theories close to practice, recognizing that ideas which have little or no relation to life, but stand apart from it, are self-condemned. However inconsistent at times Froebel's thought may appear, it must not be forgotten that it is insight rather than exactitude in thought that tells most powerfully on human life. (3) A third feature of Froebel's thought which should be noted is his *emphasis upon individuality*. For him the *tendency to individuation* is the unconscious or conscious tendency of every finite thing. For Froebel an *individual* is essentially a *creative entity: it is what it can do*, and where there is no activity there is no being,—no reality. In man, as in the things of nature, is a manifestation of the divine essence, a manifestation which necessarily attains to higher expression and fuller consciousness. Although dependent upon nature, upon humanity, upon God as much as the stone by the wayside or the beast of the field, yet man's dependence is of a different character. The divine life expresses itself in man not simply as existence, or nutrition, sensation and impulse, but in desire, in the knowledge of nature, in sympathy for things human, in the creation of the beautiful, in aspiration towards the good. By the presentation (*Darstellung*) or realization of the individual life, therefore, which Froebel identifies with the educational ideal, he means the evolution of the spiritual nature of the individual, the development of conscious self-determining activity in conformity with the law or purpose immanent in all

things. In virtue of reason man can organize the objects and beings about him into systems,—*nature* and *humanity*,—and gradually rise to the unity of essence and manifestation, of inner and outer, and the recognition of God as the immanent life of both. (4) While emphasizing the right of the individual to development, Froebel, with Hegel, clearly recognized that only in the spiritual community of human institutions, the home, the school, society, the state, the church, does the individual attain true selfhood. The individual in any stage of his development is an organism in the larger organism of life. The center of Froebel's educational theory is the thought of the individual, but the individual regarded from the twofold point of view, as a partially independent unity, and as part of a larger whole. To keep these two aspects in view was one of the problems upon which his mind was most completely set in the working out of his educational ideas: to balance the notions of self-realization and of membership in a more inclusive unity. His thought is perhaps more adequately expressed by saying that the individual at any state of his existence is in a process of organization or unification. (See Butler, *Status of Education at the Close of the Century*, in *N. E. A. Proceedings*, 1900; Dewey, *The School and Society*; Harris, *How the School Strengthens the Individuality of the Pupil*, in *Educational Review*, October, 1902, Howison, *On the Correlation of Elementary Studies*, in *Report of Commissioner of Education*, 1895-96.)

Other conceptions which form integral elements in the thought of Froebel and which can here merely be named in briefest form are the following: (1) The conception of the unity and continuity of (i) mental development, (ii) educational factors, (iii) educative materials. (2) The demand that the doctrine of principles direct its attention not to cognition by itself, but to the activity of psychical life as a whole. The standard of attainment is not therefore intellectual, but spiritual. (3) The conception of the educational process as possible because the self and the world are not mechanical dispartes but rather elements in one organic spiritual process. (4) The attempt to work out a systematic plan for the upbuilding of experience in harmony with the idealistic view of consciousness as a self-active principle in the creation of an intellectual and moral

world. The conception of man not as mere knower but as worker. (5) Education as a *process of social interaction*. The work of the mother in the education of the child. Froebel planned for parents and teachers as well as for children. The kindergarten as a society of children, engaged in play and its various forms of self-expression, through which the child comes to learn something of the values and methods of social life, without as yet being burdened by too much of intellectual technique. The education of the individual conceived as growth in freedom (personality) through the organization of interests, purposes, activities into a *system of life*. Education is a process of mediation between the individual and the law or comprehensive order of things (natural and human) in such a way that the law lives in the individual *not as constraint but as nature*, and he only is truly a *person* whose impulses are conformed to the law of all life. (6) The idea of education through processes rather than through products. (7) The significance of the principle of imitation in the upbuilding of experience. (8) The conception that education by development demands the closest conformity of the education to the nature of the individual. For this reason it must closely follow the child-soul through all the successive stages. The primary aim is to awaken and to stimulate the innate principle of life in its development according to eternal laws. It is the mother upon whom, first of all, this duty devolves: the home thus becoming invested with a deep and far-reaching significance as the first seat of culture. (9) Psychology of educative materials. The educative significance of play. (10) The kindergarten as a social institution. (11) The educative significance of nature. For Froebel the phenomena of nature are not expressionless. They possess a language, visible and audible, which their mere reduction to law does not wholly exhaust, but is disclosed to the feeling, to the intuition, to the *wise passiveness* of the soul. (12) Religion as the fundamental disposition governing the individual's participation in the spiritual life. (13) His insistence upon service as the goal of education. (14) His vindication of the sacredness and original soundness of human nature. (15) The conception of life in its entirety as one great educational opportunity, and of the various institutions, home, school,

society, the state, the church as instruments in the realization of this larger human culture.

II. In illustration of the difficulties which Froebel encountered in attempting to formulate his educational ideas there may be mentioned his strange terminology, in the use of which he was influenced by Krause; his lack of literary form; "his absurd etymologies; his lapses into artificial symbolism; his puerile analogies and formal allegories." There are, however, more serious difficulties in his thought, difficulties which seem to lie in the way of an indiscriminate acceptance of his as *a thoroughly consistent and satisfactory theory of education*. Certain of these difficulties should be briefly referred to:

(a) It was admitted above that Froebel never succeeded in giving to his philosophy of education the rounded completeness of scientific system. In Herbart we find the trained philosopher, thoroughly alive to the need as well as the nature of system, and anxious according to the custom of his day to show the educational implications of his general philosophical theory. It is but natural, therefore, that Herbart's educational doctrines should be given to us in a highly organized form. Froebel, however, resembles Herder, Schelling, and the Romanticists generally in his inability to keep his poetic, his philosophic, and his religious ideas apart. Logic, ethics, psychology, epistemology are all fused together by him, as so often by Plato, in a semi-religious synthesis. The philosophic spirit and a large measure of philosophic insight were his, but not the power of philosophic exposition or of selecting an adequate vehicle for the transmission of his ideas. Much of his thinking is the outcome of the true Romantic impulse to revel in a content attained through intuition and symbolism rather than as a result of critical reflection. The natural trend of his mind was rather in the direction of great symbolic intuitions than of the somewhat arid ways of critical analysis.

(b) Permeating Froebel's conception of the educational process and the educative materials are lurking certain ideas which not only endanger, but which to all appearances are in flat contradiction to the monistic view of reality upon which his general philosophy is based. It was implied in preceding sections that the position of idealistic monism affords on the whole a more

satisfactory basis for a philosophy of education than does pluralistic realism, and chiefly because *Realism* while conceiving the Absolute not as one but as many *independent realities* asserts the possibility of their real communion with one another. Idealism (and this is in harmony with the doctrine of evolution) asserts that it is impossible to view man and nature, the social and the natural orders, as isolable in any other than an ideal way. In this, moreover, Idealism is supported by indubitable facts connected with the evolution of the religious and the æsthetic consciousness, of the sciences, and of the commercial and industrial evolution of society. The question, then, to be asked concerning the thought of Froebel is this: Is the dualistic conception of the individual's environment, nature and humanity, presupposed throughout his interpretation of studies and in the gifts and occupations, consistent with the general philosophical position fundamental to Froebel's system, and, if it is not consistent, does it furnish us a philosophical and unitary principle by which to determine educational materials? With Kant, Froebel seems still to accept a dualism between mind and nature (nature, as physical environment, or so-called objects in space apart from mind). According to the idealistic monism underlying his thought *nature is not something which merely encompasses or surrounds man or society in a mechanical way*; it is something which enters organically into the very makeup of human life. Nature without man is blind: man without nature is an impossibility. Nature and man are not two entities,—a belief from which Kant never entirely freed himself,—but terminal aspects of one spiritual process. Nature, then, in the philosophical and ethical sense means for idealism the processes and materials, *not which lie beyond or external to social life, but which essentially and organically condition it*. In the educational sense, nature means the realization (as *worths*) and comprehension (as *means*) of these same processes and materials. To admit that in educational theory this separation of mind and nature is a matter of no importance is to deny the significance of Idealism for educational theory, and to forfeit the benefits to be gained from the attempts of Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel to reconcile the apparent opposites, mind and nature, soul and body, freedom and law, natural inclination and moral

effort, mechanism and teleology, nature and culture, as stages through which the spiritual order is realized. (See also the general discussion of the Kantian epistemology, Chap. VI, sec. 4.)

(c) The results of the same dualistic tendency in Froebel's thought may be noted in a slightly different form in seeking an answer to the question, Has Froebel adjusted in a satisfactory way his threefold conception of the Gifts (to take these as typical), first, as the medium through which the individual comes to an intellectual mastery of objects in space; second, as divided into the *life*, *knowledge*, and *beauty* forms, a distinction at times *approaching a separation analogous to the divisions of the faculty psychology*; third, as *mediating to the individual typical forms of social experience*? In seeking an answer to this question it is necessary to keep in mind several factors which are, in reality, implicit in Froebel's general philosophical position: (1) *The continuity of development.* (2) Froebel's demand that we are to "give to each stage that which the stage demands." (3) The need of *educative* as well as mere *disciplinary* activity. (4) Without *the relation-giving action of mind* there would be no objective-world. (5) This relation-giving function is *not merely individual but social.* (6) The fact that *the conscious distinction between man and nature is itself the result of a process*, arising only through later reflection, and that *the young child is not yet prepared for the specialization or isolation* (of norms, ends, and values, on the one side, and of the processes or materials through which these norms, ends, and values are realized) demanded by the divisions between man and nature. (7) The fact that *the child's life goes on in the medium or environment of society.*

To a degree, then, in Froebel's interpretation of the Gifts and Occupations the old dualism of mind and nature still seems to persist. Alongside this dualistic conception is one more in harmony with the idealistic psychology of Fichte and of modern idealistic psychology generally,—a conception, however, which Froebel did not always consistently maintain. The more important characteristics of this position may be indicated in some detail, in order that we may have a standard by which to estimate Froebel's actual achievement:

(a) The conception maintains a *functional* view of mind, *i.e.*,

in the wider sense, namely, that the mind is *no isolated entity*: it is not something which has activity; it is activity. We no longer speak of *mind and its faculties*, of functions and that which has functions. The mind is real only in its activity, or rather, *its activity, its functioning, is its reality*. The mind or self is activity operating *in intrinsic relations to social situations*, to a larger social order (*i.e.*, social in the widest as well as the narrowest sense). The general position of the view of the soul as thus conceived is that in determining what consciousness is recourse must be had to an examination of *what consciousness does*. It attempts to escape the extreme positions of both (1) Empiricism, according to which the mind is conceived as a product rather than a principle, and of (2) Rationalism, which in one form or other conceives of the soul as a pre-existing spiritual entity, endowed with capacities or faculties, *prior to the exercise of such faculties or capacities*, existing behind these as a kind of (transcendental) substance or substratum, and before the objective world has as yet disturbed the pure unity of its essence. The view of evolutionary-idealism is not that the mind is mere product or epiphenomenon, nor a mere transcendental spiritual substance which (so far as actual experience is concerned) is a pure abstraction, but that it is *a concrete specific activity constantly directed to the accomplishment of something* and not only the bearer of the experience process, but an efficient agent in its furtherance. From this general conception it follows (1) that in the mental life, as an organic unity, consciousness cannot (without a complete departure from reality) be abstracted from its relations. Prior to and apart from objective experience consciousness is an illusion. It will thus be apparent how necessary it is in the analysis of experience to keep in mind its organic unity: in other words, the organic relation between consciousness and its object, *the agent and the situation or conditions in which the activity proceeds*. (2) That just as the life elements, organism and environment (compare the act of breathing, which is a functional coördination of the lungs as organ and air as environment), so the mental life is a continuous coördination or functioning of two elements, self and environment. Herein we see the difficulty in the Empirical and Rationalistic position. Just as some biologists would

identify function with organ alone, making environment purely external, or with environment alone, making the organ simply product, so the Empiricist would make the self a product and not a principle, while the Rationalist would make the soul a principle existing prior to its contact with the objective world, and, at most, maintaining only incidental relations with the latter. On the other hand, the evolutionary view of mind maintains that the relation of consciousness or self to objective experience or environment is absolute and intrinsic. An isolated consciousness is no consciousness at all: it is a self-contradiction. (3) Since the mental life is not the outcome of a predetermined self upon an external environment, or of the adjustment of the self to a predetermined environment, neither the self nor the environment are eternally fixed in themselves, but both change in the movement of the life-process. In the functional movement of the mental life both the self and the environment are modified and determined. Both are essentially transitional, in a continual process of becoming. The self is real in so far as it continues to act, to become, to progress. (4) Self-consciousness is not a subsequent or higher growth of consciousness, but in rudimentary form at least is a quality of all consciousness. It is consciousness with the emphasis on the subject rather than the object, the agent rather than the situation.

(b) Sensations and ideas are not ends in themselves: they are, so to speak, clues or stimuli in directing activity. All knowledge involves both percepts and concepts, sensations and ideas and their combination. These may be discussed from the point of view of (i) origin, (ii) content. (1) *Sensations*: (i) The biologist maintains that the organs of sense had their origin in the problem of the life-process. Such variations as were of service in the life-struggle were selected; others, offering no positive contribution, were discarded. The sense-organs were thus in their origin organs of adjustment, methods of economy; through natural selection their increasing perfection meant more perfect adjustment, *i.e.*, increasing self-maintenance on the part of those possessing them. Thus, *biologically, the knowledge mediated by the sense-organs had its origin in the needs of the life-process; it was an instrument of control, in securing food or*

escaping danger. (ii) In the child again, activities in the form of inherited instincts and impulses precede sensations. His characteristic is impulsiveness; he is essentially a motor being. The child's curiosity is preparatory to some activity, a prelude to behavior. It is ever in the interest of some experiment on the part of some bodily organ, usually the hand or mouth. For him, *the objects of his environment are the particular activities which they suggest and distinct sensations are the sensible news of his behavior.* (iii) In the adult consciousness, likewise, the sensation is a sign, and has significance only as part of a larger whole. When do we have sensations? Examine such experiences as taking the car, looking at your watch, the clock's ceasing to tick, walking over an unaccustomed road, moving the ears, etc. It will be found in such experiences that *sensations either regulate activity, or are signs within the experience circuit, i.e., the retrospective reference; or, through their appeal to attention, they furnish the materials of a new problem, i.e., their prospective reference.* (2) *Ideas.* Only a very brief outline can be made in this connection. The concept or idea, as is true of sensation, has a retrospective as well as a prospective reference. It is (i) *a register of past experience*, a habit, a method of ordering sensations. On the other hand, an idea embodies (ii) *a plan of action.* Its function within experience is *not only to organize experience, but to institute or furnish the method of future experience.* Its function, therefore, is essentially mediatory, instrumental. Thus the definition of *idea* is in terms of its function, of its position in the movement of experience. It is the instrument of the growth of experience from the less rich and less definite to the richer and more definite forms. To illustrate, take the judgment, *The pencil is sharp.* *Sharp* is an idea, but *sharpness* does not exist in reality; only as a quality, emphasized within, or abstracted from experience. Why, then, form the 'idea' or 'concept' of that which does not exist? Simply because the idea, so emphasized or abstracted, will furnish a sign, a plan, a method of future action. The idea 'sharp,' then, is ultimately instrumental to a larger experience process, e.g., that of writing. Ideas, then, in providing a method or plan of action *make for economy within experience*, enable us to anticipate and thereby *control future*

experiences. They are thus constructions of the past and of the future. Herein is their kinship with science. Ideas are plans of action. Laws of science are constructions of the past and future behavior of those realities with which man has to deal. Ideas and sciences are thought-constructions for the registration and control of experience. Sensations, ideas, science, are thus seen to be *regulative and mediatory in the conduct of life.*

(c) *The child gets at nature through human life, through a human medium.* Its approach to the world, its normal study of it, is teleological. This conclusion of philosophical idealism, namely, that nature and civilization, matter and mind, body and soul, are not self-subsisting, isolated entities (or at best only mechanically related), but are rather complementary phases of one spiritual movement, seems to be confirmed in a unique way when we turn to the interpretation of any one of the great lines of human interest and endeavor. Only the barest suggestion of such lines of possible inquiry and confirmation can be given here. It will be noted how in sympathy they are with the thought of Hegel and the spirit, *if not always the letter, of Froebel.*

(1) The religious influence of external nature has in almost every age coöperated in producing in man the belief that within or behind so-called material things there is a spiritual reality. Idealism finds in the great, historical religions a striking confirmation of its own central position that the universe of nature, though for purposes of description, distinguished as material, is fundamentally a manifestation of spirit. Through countless generations, then, nature, working in and through the religious consciousness, has exercised a unique influence in the education of the human soul. (2) Another striking confirmation of the idealist's contention of the ultimate kinship and, hence, possible community between man and nature, might be found in tracing the growth of man's æsthetic interest in nature, in what is sometimes called the poetic interpretation of nature. Just as through science nature is seen to be interpenetrated with rationality, so through art and poetry in their process of idealization has it been shown to be suggestive of moral and æsthetic values. (3) Through the development of economic and industrial life in modern times the dependence of man on nature in the realization of his purposes and the perpetuation of his

experience is being more and more acknowledged and understood. Industrial and commercial life are forcing upon the mind of man a newer and higher teleological interpretation of his natural environment, and proving to him how completely human life and progress are involved in the subjugation of nature. (4) Science, again, and Idealism meet on common ground. Science rests on the belief that there is a correspondence between the course of nature and the mind of man. This faith is its presupposition: the establishment of the correspondence is its goal. The sciences so far developed are an evidence of the affinity between *the intelligence of man and the intelligible order of nature*. It is only necessary to refer to its history to show in what manifold ways, though through a discipline both severe and prolonged, the struggle for scientific knowledge has been fitted to discipline the intelligence and the moral nature of man.

It was said above that *the child gets at nature through human life, through a human medium*. In the process the child contributes the activity (at first instinctive or impulsive); society (nature and humanity) contributes the situations, the norms, *the system of purposes*. (Compare the positions especially of Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel.) A further illustration of the organic connection between what Froebel designates the inner and outer may be given in a consideration of the teleological relation of mind and body. With the idealism which Froebel strove to appropriate it is assumed that the essence of being is one in kind, and spiritual. Between mind and body there is no essential antagonism or opposition. The mind is no fixed entity separable from matter. If we are to trust our experience matter cannot be as foreign to consciousness as is ordinarily believed. If the analysis made above be true, mind and matter, soul and body, are terminal aspects of a unitary, living, spiritual experience, organic throughout, and in which the so-called nervous system, body, or matter, is instrumental, the machinery of its growth, and of its expanding life. Many look upon the physical as something set over against the spiritual, something that restricts, confines, enslaves. According to the view expressed here the physical, with its senses and stimuli, is the very means whereby we gain freedom. The child, feeling the pain from

the finger thrust into the flame, and thereby restraining itself afterwards, is not limited by its bodily senses or its nervous system. Rather is its nervous system the very instrument through which its freedom is gained. Moreover, just as the body, and nature itself, are instrumental to the self, and no mere hindrance, in like manner is the machinery of institutions no mere hindrance, but the very medium of escape for the individual from the domination of mere instinct and impulse to conscious self-determination. No adequate statement of freedom as a ready-made faculty or power of mind can be given in a paragraph, if at all. Yet when we take the so-called physical and institutional life, not as mere external and antagonistic opposites, but rather *from the teleological and instrumental point of view*, we may realize more fully the significance of the most apparent and the most fundamental fact in experience, namely that the consciousness of self implies the consciousness of the not-self, and grows with it, and by means of it. Thus conceiving the self and the world as the terminal aspects of a living organic reality or experience and communicated to us (through consciousness) in inseparable correlation we can regard neither one as a resultant of the other. Together they constitute a functional manifestation of a unity which is their common and absolute ground. What, then, is enforced in this section is the impossibility of conceiving a soul or mind in itself, a pre-existing entity, or of matter in itself, a self-contained existence. Keeping by experience we recognize that subject and object are never met by us apart. They are distinctions within a unity, but not different or antagonistic entities. And it scarcely need be remarked in passing that the doctrine outlined above is neither *materialism* nor *subjective idealism*. It is an attempt to construe teleologically the relation of mind and matter, self and not-self, the individual and institutions, without obliterating their differences nor reducing one to the other; securing the reality of both in a life whose variety is unity and whose essence is spiritual. The ultimate reality of the finite self *lies in its meaning* (its functional relation and activity) *not for itself alone but as part of the entire system of Absolute experience* (so-called physical, social, etc.). To begin with, the self is an organ that through its endowment of consciousness may erect itself into

membership in the organic, spiritual system of universal experience or activity, which in turn is to be conceived as necessarily differentiating and expressing itself in the growing life of its parts. If the Absolute is conscious life, it must also be social. But a "society" is not a mere aggregation of parts: to say that it is an organism is to assert something quite different. Accepting the view of reality as an organic and self-differentiating unity, the finite self in its experience declares itself as a fundamental differentiation of this reality. Just as in the physical organism (only the imperfect approximation of a true organic unity) the various parts or differentiations, in a sense, have within them the content of the whole, so selves or persons, as fundamental differentiations growing into self-consciousness, have potentially within them the content of the entire organism of reality, though of course not in the same way that the organism itself contains it. In himself the individual self is naught, in union with the whole of reality everything is potentially his. As a spiritual being, therefore, there is nothing which may be regarded as the individual's exclusive possession. He shares, participates in a common life. This is the community of the spiritual life. From first to last the life of the individual is a shared life, a life shared with nature, and human beings. *But with these it is shared. They are not its origin.* In the attempt to account for the origin of the individual, as a spiritual process of experience, we are ultimately forced to regard this process of individual life as a process of realizing the universal experience through itself. Human experience thus becomes a progressive acquaintance with and adjustment to Absolute Reality.

(d) In viewing civilization as the progressive articulation and realization of human nature which still persists in the spiritual experience, the intellectual interests, the habits of conduct of the present, it is assumed that (1) the most satisfactory psychology of race-development is a psychology of action: The ultimate social fact is "*men acting together for the sake of interrelated ends.*" These ends may be protection, wealth, worship, what not; man's ever-increasing wants rising into desires and his perpetual efforts to satisfy those wants. But back of this notion of men in functional relation to one another and to their environment we cannot go. The history of civilization is the

history of human achievement. (2) The conditions or materials of human activity are *nature*. Civilization is ultimately possible because man and nature are not isolated entities, but rather phases of one spiritual movement. In a very real sense the direct influence of nature upon man is greatest when he is in *the primitive stage of development*. In the process of social evolution through institutions, the growth of knowledge, the increase of tools and inventions, there is developed a psychical medium through which the direct physical influence of nature is humanized and mediated. Nature, from the physiological point of view, does still influence the individual directly: but psychically or educationally nature's influence is mediated through the process of social life of which the individual throughout his career is a member. From the beginning man has been in some kind of functional relation to his environment. His life has presented itself to him as a series of problems to be solved: and these problems are social as well as individual. Man's achievements are social achievements and have therefore been brought about by some form of social action and coöperation. It may be said, then, that *civilization*, or *culture*, represents the values, norms, ideals; *nature* is the processes, materials, the means of their realization. It is the methods discovered by man in the course of his experience for the registration, organization, control, and perpetuation of his experience. It has thus a retrospective as well as a prospective aspect. In civilization, therefore, *as the organization of human life thus far attained*, there are certain fundamental methods or norms which are inherent in its natural constitution and which reproduce themselves in all its manifold forms. In the analysis of these normative elements, Science, Language, Art and Literature, Institutions, and Religion, these must be continually viewed as inter-related aspects of a common social experience or activity: they are the general elements of civilization,—elements which constitute *the real existence of the concrete and organic unity of society*. Each of these elements has its retrospective and prospective reference: each represents a fundamental habit and accommodation in the life of the race. All together they are functional elements within the social process, mediating agencies in the communication or transmission of experience, instrumental

to the spiritual life of man. The evolution in nature and in civilization has its goal in the elevation and expansion of the personal life. It will thus be recognized how necessary to any adequate statement of the "Course of Study" is a chart of civilization,—a morphological or psychological presentation of the *great methods or norms according to which human experience has been organized, elevated, and expanded*. Adequately to state what science, art, and religion mean in the movement of the individual's experience, it is ultimately necessary to trace their significance in the movement of the spiritual experience of the race.

12. If the foregoing be a fair, though brief, statement of the position of evolutionary idealism it will be possible to discover just how far the position of Froebel coincides, and wherein his system tends here and there to diverge from or wholly abandon the conception which seems to the evolutionary idealist to be along the way where truth lies. The important questions, then, to ask concerning Froebel's treatment of studies, and perhaps especially of the gifts and occupations, are these: (1) Do they, in any way, force upon the child *a distinction* (between man and nature, or between man and social life) *which is the result of later reflection and abstraction*? (2) Does Froebel, and to what degree, divorce *sense* or *thought training* from the normal system of activities and purposes,—*activities and purposes in which alone sensations and ideas gain their significance*? If such be the case, such training must ultimately become mechanical and valueless educationally, producing, indeed, what Dr. Harris speaks of as arrested development. What is to be our standard of sense and thought training? If we accept the *voluntaristic*, or evolutionary-idealistic position, it follows that for the child there must be a *motive to activity*, an outlet beyond itself,—a motive which forms part of a teleological system. Do the Gifts and Occupations (to take them as typical) always provide a motive sufficient to make the activity of the child significant? (Compare the criticisms which have been made on the formalism of the Kantian Ethics, and his complete separation between reason and desire.) Does Froebel in the Gifts and Occupations, to any degree, return to the *intellectualistic* position from which he was attempting to get away? Does Froebel introduce pre-

maturely the technique of certain activities apart from their relation to or significance or function within the child's experience? Is his analysis of the Gift, for the most part, a logical or psychological one? Is it made from the educator's or from the learner's point of view? The psychology of a gift, occupation, or study, implies the interpretation of the experience, for which the gift or study stands, from the genetic point of view, *i.e.*, from the point of view of the one who is realizing the experience; whereas the logic of a study is an analysis of the experience for which it stands, from the point of view of the one who has passed through the experience. (3) Does Froebel consistently make the child, as an active social being, with needs, impulses, purposes which receive their interpretation or fulfilment through social life, the *center for correlation*, or does he at times approach the *intellectualistic* position of Herbart, and make *not activities but ideas, not processes but products*, the educative centers? (4) Is Froebel's treatment of the relations of the natural, supernatural, and spiritual worlds consistent with his general monistic and immanent point of view? Has he adjusted in a consistent manner one to the other, the *so-called* life, knowledge, and beauty forms of the gifts?

The difficulties inherent in Froebel's treatment of the subject-matter of instruction may now be briefly summarized: (1) His failure to work out a *theory of knowledge* which would be *consistent with his general philosophical position*. (2) His frequent lapse from a *voluntaristic* psychology to a psychology of the *intellectualistic type of Herbart*. (3) His failure to keep always in mind the implications of his own doctrine of the social nature of consciousness. (4) His failure to distinguish in every case between the *logic of studies* and their *psychological aspect*, in other words, between studies as organized social experience and as modes of self-realization.

13. A further difficulty remains to be mentioned, the difficulty arising from what Dr. Harris speaks of as the *biological analogy*. It is by no means clear that Froebel's thought is free from the error due to the analogous application of the categories from one level of existence to the phenomena of a different order. This tendency, unfortunately, led him into all sorts of difficulties. "This tendency at the present time," says Professor

Baldwin, "is the bane of contemporary science other than physical. The theory of evolution is responsible for much of this cheap apology for science—biology used in sociology, physics in psychology, the concept of energy in history, etc. Evolution has been mistaken for reduction, the highest genetic modes being 'explained' in terms of the lowest, and much of the explaining done by 'explaining away' most that is characteristic of the highest. And biological or organic evolution itself is a storehouse of mistaken analogies brought over into the moral sciences."—(*Development and Evolution*, p. 334. See also the article of Dr. Harris, *The Danger of Using Biological Analogies in Reasoning on Educational Subjects*, Proceedings N. E. A., 1902.) The fact must not be overlooked in educational theory that the analogous application of principles from one order of being does not suffice to explain the phenomena of a higher order of being. The standard must be reversed before final interpretations may be made. The biological analogy may be used as preliminary to the analysis of such categories as organism, adaptation, development, environment, etc., because it is helpful, not because it is final. The fundamental category of self-consciousness, the working hypothesis of philosophic inquiry, can be understood, as Descartes long since pointed out, only through its own light. The key to its understanding is within itself.

The difficulty in the biological analogy as it affected the thought of Froebel is seen in his attempt to reconcile, (1) the conception of education as a *natural development*, the outcome of the silently operative laws of nature (in certain statements, it must be admitted, that Froebel approaches dangerously near the position of Rousseau, according to whose theory education must be *subordinated to nature* and at most consists in the removal of obstructions); and (2) the Fichtean conception of education which views it as essentially a *self-determining activity in the face of oppositions and in the light of ever worthier ideals*; in other words, the conception which demands *that activity be educative*. Though Froebel has furnished the general *schema*, and has perhaps done more than any other man to work out *in its principles a system* in which the two conceptions (from one point of view they are the conceptions, on the one hand of Leibnitz,

and of Hegel on the other) are adjusted, it is not clear that their reconciliation is wholly satisfactory. The attainment of such a goal presupposes a long period of social coöperation as well as a body of organized knowledge obtained through an adherence to the *criteria* and *methods* of a strictly scientific and philosophic procedure.

14. It is always a difficult task to separate what is permanent from what is transitory in our inheritance from the past: it is one, however, which each generation has to undertake for itself. There is an especial reason why we should bring to the study of Froebel a truly critical and yet sympathetic attitude. His system presents a type of educational organization more in harmony with the spirit of democratic society than any other hitherto proposed. He himself declared, indeed, that the spirit of the American nationality was the only one in the world with which his method was in complete harmony and to which its legitimate institutions would present no barriers. On the other hand, it is asserted at the present time that the democratic institutions of America are on trial. Some there are who declare that the school has been unable to fulfil its part as the bulwark of democracy. The question, therefore, comes to us, What have the ideas of Froebel accomplished and what more can they accomplish in meeting the needs of American civilization? The spread of his ideas during the last twenty years is perhaps the most significant fact in the educational life of America during that period. Froebel saw in a unique way *the restorative function of the child and child-nature in the spiritual life of men and women*, and came to regard it as the deepest source of human welfare and improvement. With singular clearness he recognized that out of the education of the spiritual nature alone can issue that life and force and spirit which makes for democratic civilization in the highest sense.

As is well known, Froebel worked back in his thought from a survey of education in general to the education of a particular period. Had time and opportunity been vouchsafed to him, he would doubtless have framed a scheme of development in which he would have insisted on the same fundamental principles found in his formulation of the educative process in the kindergarten period. In this country at the present time the watch-

word is 'educational reconstruction' all along the line, in the elementary, secondary, and higher stages. It is, therefore, but natural to ask, *If Froebel's principles are operative (in the main) in one stage, are they not also valid in the other stages as well?* How far do the present methods and processes of the kindergarten relate themselves to the home life and experiences of the child, and to what extent do the same methods prepare the way to his subsequent development? Just here is the opportunity once more for those who will lay to heart and live by the spirit and truth, and not the mere letter, of Froebel's thought. The burden of criticism, of unceasing study, pursued in a spirit of openness to the light and fidelity to the truth, must not be shirked. If Froebel's thought is to assist in the educational reconstruction, if it is to shape the new education as it should, it must itself be criticised and freed from certain imperfect forms in which it has become embodied. *It must be modified or transformed in the light of truths brought forward by science and by the changed conditions of the Western world*,—truths which it cannot afford to neglect. *We live spiritually*, says Professor Royce, *by out-living our formulas and by thus enriching our sense of their deeper meaning*. The thought of Froebel, or the thought to which the thought of Froebel has given birth, must show itself capable of adaptation to the varied conditions, the novel social environment, the needs and aspirations of American life: it must be inclusive not exclusive: it must show itself capable of reconciling its adherents with themselves and of lifting their minds above the level of controversy; it must be self-assertive, and yet self-critical, disowning the unquestioning attitude of the partisan. Then and then only can it win the triumphs for which Froebel hoped and labored, and for which his true disciples hope and labor in turn.

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Practice, The Educational Situation, The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge, Principles of mental development as illustrated in early infancy, Logical conditions of a scientific treatment of morality, The Interpretation Side of Child Study, also *Elementary School Record*; Eby, *The Reconstruction of the Kindergarten*, in *The Pedagogical Seminary*, July, 1900; Francke, *History of German Literature*; Harris, *Psychologic Foundations of Education, Kindergarten Psychology, Social Culture in the Form of Education and Religion*, in *Educational Review*, January, 1905; also various articles in *Educational Review* and *Proceedings N. E. A.*; Hayward, *The Educational Ideas of Pestalozzi and Froebel*; Hughes, *Froebel's Educational Laws*; Mackenzie, *Outlines of Metaphysics*; Paulsen, *Evolution of the Educational Ideal*, in *Forum*, 1897; Roberts (Ed.), *Education in the Nineteenth Century*; Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*; Russell, *German Higher Schools*; Snider, *Social Institutions*; Spalding, *Development of Educational Ideas in the Nineteenth Century*, in *Educational Review*, November, 1904; *Early History of the Kindergarten in St. Louis, Mo.*, in the *St. Louis Annual Report*, 1878-79; Vandewalker, *The Kindergarten and Higher Education*, in *Educational Review*, November, 1898; Welton, *A Synthesis of Herbart and Froebel*, in *Educational Review*, Vol. XX; Young, *Isolation in the School*, also, *Scientific Method in Education*.

Further problems for study:

1. Literary and philosophic influences in the life of Froebel.
2. Froebel's indebtedness to Pestalozzi.
3. Points of similarity between Froebel's and Leibnitz's view of knowledge.
4. The genesis of the ethical motive underlying the Kindergarten.
5. The conception of the individual in Rousseau and Froebel.
6. Froebel's solution of the equation between the individual and the social.
7. Play and work.
8. The child-study of Froebel.
9. The psychology of Occupations.
10. Bases of the Kindergarten program.
11. Froebel's conception of education in relation to the problem of democracy.
12. The adjustment of the Kindergarten to contemporary needs.

IX

RETROSPECT AND CONCLUSION

In concluding the present outline attention may be directed in a brief manner to certain truths which have tended to re-

appear constantly in the consideration of the period under review:

(a) Educational ideas are not artificially produced; they obey the laws of living organisms, are transmitted from generation to generation, and bear the impress of each succeeding age. The educational ideas of the period from Lessing and Herder to Hegel and Froebel were the outcome of the life and spirit of the German people during that era of transition, of aspiration, and of reconstruction. The work of the great educators of the period formed one of the most potential influences in a period of national humiliation in kindling in the German people an aspiration towards a worthier national life. Through their influence education became one of the vital movements of the time.

(b) The entire period, from one point of view it may be said, was one in which the true nature of the individual was made known. Rousseau, Kant, Lessing, Goethe, Pestalozzi, Schleiermacher, Fichte, Herbart, Hegel, and Froebel, all pleaded, each in his way, for the rights of the individual. The period was one of struggle for completeness of individuality. But the lesson was learned that the ideal of a perfect personality is to embrace the ideal of a perfect society, that *system of life* in and through human institutions in which are garnered the spiritual experience of the human race. Individual culture, in its true sense, can proceed only in the midst of a well-organized community.

(c) Closely connected with the new doctrine of personality which emerged in the movement from Rousseau to Froebel, is the achievement of the Idealistic movement from Kant to Hegel, which is in essential agreement with another great achievement in philosophy, namely, that of Greece. While representing different epochs and interpreting different types of human experience, the import of both is essentially the same. Each is an expression of that idealism which finds the interpretation of existence in mind as the ideal and real presupposition of the world. This idealism of Plato and Aristotle, of Kant and Hegel, discovers a spiritual principle in the orderly processes of nature, in the beauty of the world, in the consciousness of man, and in the unity and continuity of the spiritual life of humanity. But the idealism of the second period is more than a mere re-

affirmation of the truth arrived at in the first. It furnished a new and fuller demonstration, rendered possible by reason of the completer experience, an experience which humanity was forced to undergo in its advance to finer issues.

(d) The movement towards democracy which gave to the nineteenth century its most distinctive feature had its origin in the increasing sense of the worth of the individual, his spiritual and social significance, his rights and duties, an appreciation which in turn had its origin in the new movements in philosophy, in ethics, in religion, in science, and the new ideals of social amelioration and reconstruction.

(e) During the period a new appreciation of the meaning and significance of civilization, as embodied in art, science, philosophy, literature, and religion, as the means of development and liberation for the individual. Instead of being a hindrance, as Rousseau supposed, it came to be recognized that civilization represents the *methods so far organized of the true life of man*. For the individual, at birth, this civilization, *this system of norms and of methods*, is his spiritual inheritance. It becomes his spiritual possession in a large and fruitful way only through education. From the ethical and therefore from the educational point of view, civilization is the vicarious offering of the race to the individual, to be used, if he will but appropriate it, for the perfecting of his nature, for the rich and varied expression of the personal life.

(f) The study of the writers of this period makes it apparent that ultimately the end by which our desires are determined rests not merely on the process of psychological development, but in the very nature of reality. It may have its individual or psychological history or genesis: being from this point of view the last phase of the development of desire: but ultimately or metaphysically, the desire is intelligible only when it is recognized as *conditioned by or implied in the very nature of things*.

(g) The thought of the period was, moreover, intensely *human*, when for man was disclosed the soul in sense, the mystical beauty of nature, the divine effluence in the human soul, the spiritual sanctions of sympathy as well as of duty, the spirit of the little child long waiting for recognition, yet the interpreter

of the past as well as the hope of all the coming years. The literature of a later time may interpret man and human life more subtly and with greater exactness: not perhaps with greater earnestness or nobility. The period won *for human thought* the fact that the permanent *reality in experience* is personality—not any longer the *isolated individual* of Rousseau, but the *person* of Froebel and Hegel entering into the wealth of the world's life, or, in Shelley's words:

“Man, one harmonious soul of many a soul,
Whose nature is its own divine control,
Where all things flow to all as rivers to the sea.”

